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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN VIRTUAL
ENVIRONMENTS: CONSIDERING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERS, PROGRAMMERS AND VIRTUAL AVATARS
Woodrow Barfield*

I. INTRODUCTION
A virtual environment is an interactive computer simulation1 which
lets its participants see, hear, use, and even modify the simulated objects
in the computer-generated environment.2 Within a virtual environment,
the user may be stimulated by a range of sensory information, including
spacialized sound,3 stereoscopic imagery,4 and force5 or tactile feedback6

*
Woodrow Barfield received a PhD in Industrial Engineering from Purdue University and a JD
from the University of North Carolina. He received an LLM in intellectual property law and policy
from the University of Washington and is currently a non-resident fellow with the Center for
Internet and Society, Stanford University. The author acknowledges David Orange for assistance in
legal research, and Bob Gomulkiewicz and Jonathan Franklin for comments on an earlier draft of
the manuscript.
1. Science fiction author William Gibson is credited with coining the term cyberspace in his
novel Neuromancer (Ace Books 1984). See generally William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of
Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
197, 220 (1995).
2. TOM FURNESS III & WOODROW BARFIELD, Introduction to VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS
AND ADVANCED INTERFACE DESIGN, in VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ADVANCED INTERFACE
DESIGN (Woodrow Barfield & Tom Furness III eds., Oxford University Press 1995).
3. ELIZABETH M. WENZEL, SCOTT S. FISHER, PHILIP. K. STONE & SCOTT. H. FOSTER, A
System for Three-Dimensional Acoustic “Visualization” in a Virtual Environment Workstation, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE ON VISUALIZATION 329-37 (IEEE Computer Society
Press 1990); see also Elizabeth M. Wenzel, Frederic L. Wightman & Scott H. Foster, Development
of a Three-Dimensional Auditory Display System, 20 ACM SIGCHI BULLETIN 52 (1988).
4. The viewing of stereoscopic imagery within a virtual environment may or may not be
head tracked using a multi- degree of freedom position tracker. When head tracked, the view of the
virtual world changes in response to movements of the user’s head.
5. Pietro Buttolo, Roberto Oboe & Blake Hannaford, Architectures for Shared Haptic
Virtual Environments, 21 COMPUTERS & GRAPHICS 421 (July-Aug. 1997).
6. See Grigore C. Burdea & Philippe Coiffet, VIRTUAL REALITY TECHNOLOGY (2d ed.,
2003).
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delivered by input devices paired to virtual objects.7 Some commentators
have argued that developments in virtual environments are occurring so
rapidly that humans may “inhabit” them within the foreseeable future.8
Although this may seem like a bold prediction, many people are already
spending significant amounts of time in virtual environments.9 One
reason for this is that the participants within virtual environments may
experience a sense of presence.10 Presence is the suspension of disbelief
that one is viewing a simulation. That is, the sense of actually “being
there,” in the computer simulation.11 More realistic virtual environments
lead to a higher sense of presence, and it has been shown that one way to
increase the realism of a virtual environment is by projecting virtual
avatars in the environment that have the ability to interact with
humans.12
One type of virtual environment that is accessed by millions of
users, and that has generated significant interest from legal scholars, is
the massively multi-player online role-playing game (MMORPG).13
Once a player enters a MMORPG, they engage in a variety of activities
with other players who are accessing the game the same way from all
over the world. MMORPG developers are in charge of supervising the
virtual world and guarantee the continuing interest of players by offering
an updated set of tasks and activities to perform in the virtual
environment.14 Most MMORPGs have been designed for profit- a player
7. The author will use the terms “virtual environment” and “virtual reality” interchangeably;
both refer to a computer-generated simulation designed to allow a user to experience a sense of
presence in the computer simulation.
8. Beth Simone Noveck, Introduction: The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (20042005).
9. See J. D. LASICA, DARKNET (2005).
10. Woodrow Barfield & Suzanne Weghorst, The Sense of Presence Within Virtual
Environments: A Conceptual Framework, in HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION: SOFTWARE AND
HARDWARE INTERFACES 699-704 (Gavriel Salvendy & Michael Smith eds., Elsevier Science
Publishers 1993).
11. Id.
12. But see generally Kristine L. Nowak, The Influence of Anthropomorphism and Agency on
Social Judgment in Virtual Environments, 9 JCMC (2004), available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol9
/issue2/nowak.html (last visited May 14, 2006).
13. Caroline Bradely & A. Michael Froomkin, Virtual Worlds, Real Rules, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 103, 121 (2004-2005).
14. Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User Created Content and Building the
Metaverse, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81 (2004-2005). See also Nicholas Yee, The Psychology of
MMORPGs: Emotional Investment, Motivations, Relationship Formation, and Problematic Usage,
in AVATARS AT WORK AND PLAY: COLLABORATION AND INTERACTION IN SHARED VIRTUAL
ENVIRONMENTS (R. Schroeder & A. Axelsson eds., London: Springer-Verlag 2005), available at
http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/02_04/Yee_Book_Chapter.pdf (last visited May 14,
2006).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/2

2

Barfield: Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments
BARFIELD1.DOC

2006]

6/1/2006 2:39:21 PM

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS

651

must either purchase the client software or pay a monthly fee in order to
access the virtual world.15 An interesting feature of a MMORPG is that it
allows its participants to design a virtual representation of their identity
which is displayed in the online virtual environment. Such an identity is
termed an avatar.
An emerging issue in online role-playing games is whether the
licensor or participant owns the virtual property (such as a virtual avatar)
created while the game is being played.16 In the online game, Second
Life,17 the Terms of Service Agreement gives residents of the virtual
world the right to retain full intellectual property protection for the
digital content they create in the game, including avatar characters,
clothing, scripts, textures, objects and designs. Such rights have realworld consequences for the objects created in the virtual world. For
example, as stated on Second Life’s webpage, “This right is enforceable
and applicable both in-world and offline, and for non-profit and
commercial ventures.”18
Generally, the term “virtual avatar” is often to describe the
simulation of a graphical form representing a particular person in a
virtual environment.19 The most sophisticated avatars can become a sort
of visual and cognitive prosthesis, representing an extension of self in
the virtual world, or what the virtual environment visitor would like to
be, or appear to be, in the virtual world. Virtual avatars may also
represent the actions of a user, different aspects of a user’s persona, or
the user’s social status in the virtual environment.20 A virtual avatar can
take on almost any form, such as a realistic representation of the human
that owns or created the avatar, another person’s identity (such as a
living or deceased actor or historic figure), an animal, or even a mythical
15. There are some free online games, but their quality is generally lower than their pay-toplay counterparts.
16. Some foreign courts have begun to accept the notion of virtual property; e.g., a Beijing
court ordered the restitution of one player’s stolen virtual weapons. See, e.g., Amy Kolz, Virtual IP
Rights Rock Online Gaming World AM. LAW. (2004), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=1101738506769 (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
17. Second Life, available at http://secondlife.com/commerce/ip.php (last visited Oct. 31,
2005).
18. Id.
19. It is possible to purchase virtual avatars of different levels of fidelity. See, e.g., Stratagem
Corp., Dreamscape Body Catalog (2005), available at http://ds.avatarwares.com/awbodiesds.htm
(last visited May 26, 2006). Avatars are also called: characters, players, virtual actors, icons, or
virtual humans.
20. The traditional avatar used on many internet forums is a small square shaped area close to
the user’s forum post. John Suler, The Psychology of Avatars and Graphical Space in Multimedia
Chat Communities, available at http://www.rider.edu/suler/psycyber/psyav.html (last visited March
4, 2006).
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creature.
How easy is it to create a virtual avatar? Commercial software has
been designed to allow people to create their own interactive, emoting
3D avatar using photographs of their individual faces, and their own
unique voice as templates.21 Further, when a person chats in a 3D online
world or plays an online computer game, they are operating a synthetic
character or avatar. What makes for an interesting and effective avatar
depends on the purpose for which the avatar is used. In the case of a
virtual world where communication is important, facial features and
expressiveness must be well supported. In the case of action games, the
physics of the virtual world and interaction within the world must be
well supported.
A recent development in virtual avatars is that they are getting
smarter.22 Capable of performing a range of tasks, virtual avatars can
write poetry, play chess, compose music, and portray a range of
emotions and facial expressions.23 In electronic commerce,24 avatars are
forming contracts,25 in the field of entertainment they are replacing
actors,26 and in online games,27 avatars are interacting with humans and
other virtual avatars.28 Further, in medicine, virtual avatars are helping to
train medical students by playing the role of patient. For example, the
Virtual Standardized Patient is an avatar that interacts with medical
21. See Haptek’s PeoplePutty, available at http://www.haptek.com/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2005).
22. W. Lewis Johnson & Jeff W. Rickel, Animated Pedagogical Agents: Face-to-Face
Interaction in Interactive Learning Environments, 11 INT’L J. OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
EDUC. 47 (2000), available at http://aied.inf.ed.ac.uk/members00/archive/vol_11/johnson/full.tml
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
23. Talking Heads, available at http://www.haskins.yale.edu/haskins/heads.html (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005).
24. Ian R. Kerr, Bots, Babes and the Californication of Commerce, 1 UNIV. OF OTTAWA L.
AND TECH. J. 285 (2004) (discussing intelligent software that has made significant advances in the
field of electronic commerce, and stating that there is a trend in automated electronic commerce to
animate avatars and other electronic entities and use them to build relationships with consumers
through the illusion of friendship).
25. See Jeff C. Dodd & James A. Hernandez, Contracting in Cyberspace, 1998 SMU
COMPUTER L.J. 1, 12 (1998).
26. Joesph J. Beard, Clones, Bones, and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the
Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1165 (2001).
27. Norman I. Badler, Rama Bindiganavale, Juliet Bourne, Jan Allbeck, Jianping Shi &
Martha Palmer, Real Time Virtual Humans, Center for Human Modeling and Simulation,
Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, available at
http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~badler/bcs/Paper.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
28. See generally AVATARS IN NETWORKED VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS (Tolga K. Capin et al
eds. 1999); see also generally Peter Plantec, Virtual Humans: A Build-It-Yourself Kit, Complete
With Software and Step-By-Step Instructions (American Management Association; Bk&CD-Rom
edition 2004).
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practitioners in much the same way an actor would if hired to play the
role of patient.29 The Virtual Standardized Patient uses natural language,
emotion, behavior modeling, and composite facial expression and lipshape modeling to produce a natural patient-practitioner dialogue.30
Virtual environments can be designed for single inhabitants, such as
a solo flight trainee, or for many, simultaneous participants. When a
virtual environment supports multiple users, it can give rise to a virtual
community. It has been estimated that many of the 20 million to 30
million31 people who visit virtual worlds spend more time in the virtual
environment than the real world.32 These people are not just passively
viewing the environment. They, or their virtual representatives, are
interacting with other people or with virtual avatars of increasing
intellectual capabilities. Further, people who spend significant amounts
of time in virtual environments are doing more than playing video
games. According to one commentator, they are creating virtual worlds
where they can assume identities, build wealth and social status, and
generally participate in creating new worlds.33
A. Issues in Virtual Reality
The present format for the protection of the rights of virtual avatars
is based on determining who their owner is and then analyzing that
person’s rights with respect to the avatar or the avatar’s actions.34 In this
model, the rights protected are those of the owner and not those of the
virtual avatar. However, as virtual avatars gain in intelligence and create
works independent of human input, this analysis may be outdated. In this
scenario, avatars themselves may need legal protection. If avatars do
gain in intelligence and people spend more time in virtual worlds
interacting with virtual avatars, significant legal and policy issues will

29. Robert C. Hubal, Paul N. Kizakevich, Curry I. Giunn, Kevin D. Merino & Suzanne L.
West, The Virtual Standardized Patient: Simulated Patient-Practitioner Dialogue for Patient
Interview Training, available at http://www.cs.duke.edu/~cig/papers/MMVR.doc (last visited Oct.
31, 2005).
30. Id.
31. Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Norrath, To Kill an Avatar, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2003/feature_hunter_julaug03.html (last visited Oct.
31, 2005) (stating that the online world created by Sony, has more residents than Miami and a
bigger GNP than Bulgaria).
32. Yee, supra note 14, at 10.
33. Noveck, supra note 8, at 2.
34. See generally Woodrow Barfield, Issues of Law for Software Agents Within Virtual
Environments, 14 PRESENCE: TELEOPERATORS AND VIRTUAL ENTS, 741-48 (2005).
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arise.35 For example, since many virtual worlds are created by private
companies for their subscribers and are thus controlled by the game’s
creators, should the participants, the creators, or the virtual avatars (or
some combination) set and control the permissible actions in the virtual
environment?36 In contrast, should the users of the virtual environment
set the rules of social interactions, the physical laws that govern the
virtual world, or the laws and statutes that people and avatars live by?37
And as virtual avatars become more autonomous from human input and
decision-making, and begin to self-program,38 how should such entities
be treated by the law? 39
While there have been no cases dealing directly with the rights of
intelligent virtual avatars, there have been a few cases dealing with
issues relating generally to virtual reality.40 A brief review of these cases
provides background for the emerging issues relating to the use of
intelligent virtual avatars in virtual environments. One emerging area
where virtual environments have been used is in the reconstruction of
evidence of a crime scene.41 For example, in a criminal law case, the
defendant was convicted and sentenced to confinement for 20 years.42
As part of the evidence presented, a virtual reality recreation of the route
driven to strike the victim was shown. The Court of Appeals upheld the
allowance of this evidence concluding that the probative value of the
35. Michael B. Sapherstein, The Implications of Virtual Reality Games for Tort Lawyers, B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 112106 (1996) (discussing the tort consequences of using virtual reality
games such as reports that users may suffer from side effects including vertigo and dizziness after
exposure to virtual environments), available at http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/st_org/iptf/head
lines/content/1996112106.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
36. Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 19 (2004-2005) (the elements of an end-user license agreement could effectively limit the
range of permissible actions allowed in a virtual environment). See generally Lawrence Lessig, The
Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
759, 763 (1999).
37. See generally Lessig, supra note 36, at 759 (on the topic of regulatory standards applied to
the net).
38. There are several commercial products on the marketplace that claim to self-learn. See,
e.g., Evolution Robot Lawn Mower, available at http://www.robotshop.ca/home/shoppingguide/
suppliers/zucchetti-en/ambrogio-evolution-robot-mower.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (claiming
an electronic lawn mower has the capability to “self-program in complete autonomy”). Many
computer vision systems are also said to have the ability to learn. See, e.g., ipd Releases Sherlock
(Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://news.thomasnet.com/fullstory/26591 (last visited Nov 6, 2005).
39. See generally Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences, 11
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 147 (1996).
40. Ian R. Kerr, Spirits in a Material World: Intelligent Agents as Intermediaries in
Electronic Commerce, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 190, 208 (2001) (describing how neural nets work in the
context of electronic commerce).
41. Harris v. State, 152 S.W.3d 786 (2004).
42. See id.
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virtual reality crime scene re-creation was not substantially outweighed
by the danger of misleading the jury.43
Another case dealing with the general area of virtual reality
concerned a defendant’s claim that she was a cyborg.44 Here, the district
court dismissed the claim sua sponte.45 To summarize the facts presented
in the “cyborg” case, the plaintiff asserted that she was a cyborg and
received her information through “proteus.”46 Among other things, the
plaintiff alleged that former President Jimmy Carter was the secret head
of the Ku Klux Klan, and that he, Bill Clinton and Ross Perot were
responsible for the murder of at least ten million black women in
concentration camps.47 The court held that the standard for dismissal of
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 was met.48 In a similar case,49 the
defendant, a pro se Michigan prisoner, appealed the district court’s order
dismissing as frivolous his civil rights complaint.50 The defendant based
his claims for monetary and injunctive relief upon alleged violations of
his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.51 He alleged that he was the victim of defendants’
experiments in cybernetics; and maintained that his psychological and
physical well-being was undermined by defendants’ use of a computergenerated “virtual reality.”52 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the district
court had not abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint as
frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).53
A more traditional action concerning virtual reality dealt with the
issue of patent infringement for an input device used to manipulate
objects in virtual environments.54 In Robinson, the plaintiff alleged that
43. Id.; Fed. R. Evid. 403 (2004).
44. Tyler v. Carter, 151 F.R.D. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 537.
47. Id.
48. Proceedings in forma pauperis are frivolous when such claims describe fantastic or
delusional scenarios. Id. at 540. The court applied the same standard and found that a judge could
dismiss claims sua sponte under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) for claims that describe
fantastic or delusional scenarios. Id.
49. Nunnery v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrections, 966 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1992).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights). If an avatar gained legal
status, could such an entity claim that its civil rights had been violated? For a discussion of equal
protection law in the context of enhanced humans, see George Wright, Personhood: 2.0: Enhanced
and Unenhanced Persons and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1047
(2005).
51. Nunnery, 966 F.2d at 1453.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Robinson v. Fakespace Labs, Inc., No. 02-1152, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3914 (Fed.
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the “Robinson glove” used to manipulate virtual objects was infringed
by a similar glove produced by Fakespace.55 The court held that the
allegedly offending glove did not infringe the Robinson patent under
either literal infringement56 or the doctrine of equivalents.57 Fakespace
argued that its Pinch Glove System did not literally infringe the
Robinson patent because it lacked four of the claim limitations shown in
the Robinson patent.58 Because failure to demonstrate equivalency for
any single element in the accused device is enough to defeat an assertion
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,59 the court upheld the
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement.60
In summary, what one can conclude from the above cases is that as
people and virtual avatars spend significant amounts of time in virtual
reality, more cases will be litigated across a broad range of legal topics,
from intellectual property to criminal law, and from contracts to torts.
Given the increased use of virtual avatars in virtual environments for
tasks such as psychotherapy,61 teaching,62 and electronic commerce,63
future causes of action could be directed at the virtual avatars
themselves. If avatars continue to gain in intelligence a host of
compelling issues will be raised. For example, would intelligent avatars
be able to bring forth claims involving their own civil liberties?64 And
Cir Mar. 5, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1074 (2003).
55. Id.
56. Id. See generally Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1308 (Fed.Cir.
2002) (to prove literal infringement, the patentee must show that the accused device contains every
limitation in the asserted claims).
57. Robinson, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3914; see generally Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (discussing the doctrine of equivalents).
58. Robinson, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3914; see generally Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (discussing the issue of claim limitations in a patent
infringement case).
59. See generally Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc’ns Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the doctrine of equivalents).
60. Robinson, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3914.
61. J. Ku, W. Cho, J-J. Kim, A. Peled, B.K. Wiederhold, M.D. Wiederhold, I. Y. Kim, J.H.
Lee & S.I. Kim, A Virtual Environment for Investigating Schizophrenic Patients’ Characteristics:
Assessment of Cognitive and Navigation Ability, 6 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 397 (2003).
62. Jeffrey Young, Virtual Reality on a Desktop Hailed as New Tool in Distance Education,
The Chronicles of Higher Education, Information Technology (Oct. 6, 2001), available at
http://chronicle.com/free/v47/i06/06a04301.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
63. See Anthony J. Bellia, Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J. 1047 (2001).
64. A legal person, as opposed to a natural person, enjoys many of the rights and obligations
of individual citizens, such as the ability to own property, sign binding contracts, and pay taxes; but
they do not retain all the rights of a natural person, e.g., they do not have the right to vote or hold
public office. See generally Curtis M. Vazquez, Direct v. Indirect Obligations of Corporations
Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L. REV. 927, 944 (2005). A legal person (or
artificial person), as opposed to a natural person, enjoys many of the rights and obligations of
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just what civil liberties would be awarded to intelligent virtual avatars?
Professor George Wright has discussed the issue of equal protection
under the law in the context of “enhanced humans,” concluding that “if
there develops a typically unbridgeable gulf separating groups of
contemporaries, we must adopt a substantially realistic understanding of
equal protection that involves significant resource and opportunity
transfers.”65 Wright’s comments were directed at the differences
between enhanced and unenhanced humans; however, the possibility of
intelligent avatars raise a host of new issues concerning equal protection
under the law. In the context of humans, it may be technically possible
to provide those requesting upgrades access to the appropriate
technology. However, if intelligent avatars surpassed humans in
intelligence, would technology be available to upgrade the humans to the
level of the intelligent avatars? And if an intelligent avatar gained a level
of intelligence such that they were superior to humans, would humans
then be able to bring forth an equal protection claim against intelligent
avatars? To best serve humanity’s interests, public policy may benefit
by granting intelligent entities legal rights; if for no other reason than
they could then be regulated.
II. CREATING INTELLIGENT VIRTUAL AVATARS
The field of artificial intelligence has provided many of the
algorithms and techniques that have lead to intelligent actions by virtual
avatars.66 The software and algorithms that control virtual avatars, and
artificial entities in general, are getting more sophisticated and
“smarter.”67 As some commentators have argued, the smarter they get,
the more the current law will be strained when deciding how to account
for their actions.68 In general, advances in algorithms have resulted in
levels of creativity exhibited by artificial entities that traditionally were
considered only within the domain of humans.69 This raises several
individual citizens, such as the ability to own property, sign binding contracts, and pay taxes, but
they do not retain all the rights of a natural person, e.g., they do not have the right to vote or hold
public office. See Blacks Law Dictionary 1178 (Bryan A. Garber ed., 8th ed., West 2004) (defining
legal and natural persons).
65. Wright, supra note 50, at 1095.
66. Algorithms are used to produce goal solutions by means of a series of tests, while another
artificial intelligence technique, heuristics, solves a problem by intuition and anticipation of the
forthcoming data.
67. See generally Laura Daly, Present and Future Avatars, E3D NEWS (Dec. 2001), available
at http://www.e3dnews.com/e3d/Issues/200112-Dec/lead.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
68. See generally Barfield, supra note 34; see generally Karnow, supra note 39.
69. See generally Bob Fink, Serendipity: Computer Program Composes Beautiful Melodies
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perplexing questions - can a virtual avatar be an author, or an inventor,
own and sell intellectual property, or be liable for its actions?70
Many software programs which result in creative output use either
knowledge-based systems,71 genetic algorithms,72 or neural networks.73
Neural networks differ from traditional artificial intelligence
applications because they do not require explicit symbolic
representations to solve problems.74 Instead, they process and store
information as patterns to represent information. Specifically, the
knowledge contained within a neural network is represented by the
connection strengths between processing elements in the network,75 and
the mutual reinforcement or inhibition of elements in the network by
other elements. One area where neural networks have been used to
create virtual avatars which display intelligent behavior is in the design
of facial expressions.76 For intelligent avatars to be able to act as alter-

(1996), available at http://www.greenwych.ca/serend4.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). The
Serendipity computing system is described as taking not only notes of the scale and making
melodies of them, but also using 2 or 3-note sub-sets based on how frequently certain basic music
structures are used in the music style desired and drawing upon these sub-sets. Id. See also
Artificial Intelligence in Music and Art, 18th INT’L FLAIRS CONF. (May 15 to 17, 2005); see
generally Chris Dobrian, Music and Artificial Intelligence (1993), available at
http://music.arts.uci.edu/dobrian/CD.music.ai. htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
70. See Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47
PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1985-1986) (providing a comprehensive overview of issues associated with
whether a computer can be an author); see generally Karnow, infra note 350.
71. See Tom R. Addis, DESIGNING KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS (1986).
72. See generally DANIEL E. GOLDBERG, GENETIC ALGORITHMS IN SEARCH, OPTIMIZATION,
AND MACHINE LEARNING (Addison-Wesley 1989) (stating that genetic algorithms consist of
programs based on strings of symbols that behave analogous to genes). These programs may
compete in a common soup and reproduce and mutate their basic gene strings over time.
73. See Bruce Damer, Glossary of Common Terms Used in Virtual Worlds (1997), available
at http://www.digitalspace.com/avatars/book/appendix/glossary.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
Neural networks consist of software that replicates the behavior of biological neural
networks, carrying symbolic or numeric signals around pathways which sum and split
the signals. Neural networks are used in pattern recognition and learning and lie at the
heart of behaviors of agents, bots, biota and virtual pets. Neural networks are expected to
provide a more fundamental ‘wiring’ of virtual cyberspace in the near future.
Id.
74. See generally Nicolas D. Georganas & Emil M. Petriu, VEHICLE: Virtual Environments
for
Human
Interaction,
Communication
and
Learning,
available
at
http://www.mcrlab.uottawa.ca/research/
VEHICLE.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
75. See Artificial Neural Networks, available at http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/~reingold/
courses/ai/nn.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
76. See generally Norman I. Badler, Rama Bindiganavale, Juliet Bourne, Jan Allbeck,
Jianping Shi & Martha Palmer, Real Time Virtual Humans, Center for Human Modeling and
Simulation, Department of Computer and Information Science, available at http://www.cis.upenn.
edu/~badler/bcs/Paper.htm (last visited June 3, 2005).
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egos of their human owner, they may need to incorporate a high degree
of similarity with their owner, including facial expressions.77 Neural
networks can be trained to recognize and reproduce patterns such as
those associated with facial expressions, and to produce such patterns
based on external stimuli.
Another type of computing paradigm which has resulted in
intelligent behavior for virtual avatars is an expert, or knowledge-based,
system.78 Knowledge-based systems are those in which the computer
algorithms are able to “learn” which solutions are retainable or usable by
a series of comparisons with previously-stated material.79 This type of
programming is often referred to as an “expert system” because the
system is based on imitating the methods of particular human
practitioners, or experts, within a particular domain.80 As with neural
networks, an expert-system approach has been used to model facial
expressions for virtual avatars. When avatars interact with humans,
facial expressions are key for communicating emotions in face-to-face
conversation made simultaneously with speech. In current virtual avatar
designs, most collaborative virtual environments force the user to
explicitly set avatar emotions after they have entered text or voice
input.81 However, some researchers are investigating a procedure based
on an expert system that can be used to parse emotive expressions so
that these emotions can be automatically displayed on the corresponding
virtual avatar’s appearance.82 In many online games, a user must input
avatar body language and facial expressions via key presses which
means it is almost impossible for users to chat and emote at the same
time.83 To appear realistic, an avatar must react like humans do when
communicating with each other, and facial expressions are a step toward
designing “human-like” avatars.84
77. See generally J.J. Ventrella, Avatar Physics and Genetics, Social Aspects, in VIRTUAL
WORLDS (J.C. Heudin ed. 1999), available at http://www.ventrella.com/Alife/Avatar/avatar_4.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
78. Jimena Olveres, Mark Billinghurst, Jesus Savage & Alistair Holden, Intelligent,
Expressive Avatars, in Proceedings of the First Workshop on Embodied Conversational Characters
(WECC 1998), Lake Tahoe, California, (October 12-15, 1998).
79. Id.
80. Joseph C. Giarratano & Gary D. Riley, Expert Systems: Principles and Programming (4th
ed., PWS Publishing Co. 2004).
81. Olveres et al., supra note 78.
82. Michael Gerhard & David Moore, User Embodiment in Educational CVEs: Towards
Continuous Presence, available at http://www.lmu.ac.uk/ies/conferences/Gerhard.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2005).
83. Olveres et al., supra note 78.
84. Id.
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Genetic algorithms85 are another technique used to create
“intelligent acting” avatars in virtual reality. Generally, genetic
algorithms are search procedures that use the principles of natural
selection and genetics to solve problems. Genetic algorithms use
evolutionary techniques based on optimization to develop a solution to a
problem.86 The basic operation of a genetic algorithm is straightforward. First, a population of possible solutions to a problem are
developed, then the better solutions are recombined with each other to
form some new solutions. Finally, the new solutions are used to replace
the poorer of the original solutions and the process is repeated.
Many avatars are designed to display appropriate social behavior in
reaction to other avatars and people in a virtual environment.87 Genetic
algorithms are useful for designing avatars that can display a range of
social behaviors. The diversity of genetic customization is important in
creating a unique avatar in a virtual world, and in being a part of a large,
diverse community. To use a genetic algorithm to create various facial
expressions, the design methodology of the avatar includes identifying
variations in the parameters used in the computer code which control
facial expressions, setting ranges for these parameters, and placing them
into an array, which can be manipulated in a variety of ways.88 The array
is called the genotype. Every unique avatar designed using genetic
algorithms will have a different genotype. The gene ranges will provide
an overall genetic space within which all possible avatars can exist.
These genes will affect, for example, body shapes, colors, motions,
facial proportions, and walking styles of an avatar.89
III. VIRTUAL AVATARS AND WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP
Computers using methods in artificial intelligence have been
programmed to compose music, write poetry, and write parts of a book.
These are all areas deemed to reflect a high level of human creativity,
85. Peter Small, MAGICAL A-LIFE AVATARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE INTERNET
(Manning Publications Co. 1998); Kenrick J. Mock, Wildwood: The Evolution of L-System Plants
for Virtual Environments, available at http://www.math.uaa.alaska.edu/~afkjm/papers/Wildwood.
doc (last visited June 1, 2005).
86. See Tom S. Ray, Neural Networks, Genetic Algorithms and Artificial Life: Adaptive
Computation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1994 ALIFE, GENETIC ALGORITHM AND NEURAL NETWORKS
SEMINAR 1, INSTITUTE OF SYSTEMS, CONTROL AND INFORMATION ENGINEERS (1994).
87. Olveres et al., supra note 78.
88. Craig Reynolds, Flocks, Herds, and Schools: A Distributed Behavioral Model, 21
COMPUTER GRAPHICS 25 (July, 1987).
89. Jeffrey Ventrella, Disney Meets Darwin - An Evolutionary-Based Interface for
Exploration and Design of Expressive Animated Behavior, MIT Master’s Thesis (MIT Press 1994).
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and which result in copyrightable works of authorship. Once virtual
avatars create works of authorship, especially if they do so independent
from human input, traditional copyright notions of authorship and
originality will need to be addressed.90 This section raises the question of
whether the copyright law as currently enacted can adequately address
issues of authorship in a world of increasingly intelligent artificial
entities. Generally, if a work is completely attributable to an intelligent
avatar, then that work will be outside the ambit of federal copyright
law.91 In contrast, if a human author can be associated with the work of
an intelligent avatar, copyright law as it currently exists may adequately
account for the output generated by the avatar.
Under the Copyright Act, the author of a work is the initial owner
of the copyright in it, and may exploit the work herself or transfer some
or all of her rights in that work to others.92 The author is generally the
person who conceives of the copyrightable expression and fixes it, or
causes it to be fixed, in a tangible form.93 The Ninth Circuit, in MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., held that the loading of software
into a computer’s random access memory, was sufficiently permanent
for it to be deemed fixed.94 Given this decision, an avatar that creates a
work may be thought to have fixed it at the moment of creation.95
Therefore, in a copyright dispute involving a virtual avatar the issue for
a court will not be whether the work is fixed, but whether the virtual
avatar or another party “conceived” of the work and can serve as the
author. In some cases, an avatar’s owner or programmer may be so far
removed from the avatar’s output that they may not have any knowledge
that the output exists, or even recognize that it resulted from their
original input. In this case, should such a person be considered an
author? Given the increased complexity of virtual avatars it is pertinent
to ask – how would this decision serve the policy of encouraging authors
to create?
90. See Samuelson, supra note 70, at 1199 (one of the main reasons why computers should
not be held an author under the Copyright Act is that such entities do not need an incentive to create
works of authorship). However, once a particular bar has been raised prohibiting authorship for
intelligent entities, such as lack of incentive to create their works, that bar may be reached given the
advances in artificial intelligence to create smart machines. It is interesting to note that since
Samuelson’s 1986 article, human chess grandmasters are regularly beaten by software and the field
of electronic commerce is populated by intelligent software agents.
91. See generally Timothy L. Butler, Can a Computer Be an Author? Copyright Aspects of
Artificial Intelligence, 4 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 707 (1982).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2005).
93. See generally, Samuelson, supra note 70.
94. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
95. Id. at 519.
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Are there any existing doctrines under copyright law where a
copyright can vest in an entity that did not conceive the work or fix it in
a tangible medium of expression? The answer is yes, for example, the
“work made for hire” doctrine is an important exception to the rule that
the party who conceived of the idea is the author of a work. When a
work is made for hire, within the meaning of the Copyright Act, the
employer or commissioning party, who pays for the creation of the
work, is deemed the author, rather than the employee who may actually
have conceived of the work and fixed the expression.96 One possible
way to solve the problem of ownership of the intellectual property
created by intelligent avatars is to always deem them as works for hire,
in which case the employer or commissioning party would be the author.
However, can a virtual avatar serve as an employee?97 Could a
programmer be considered the employer of an intelligent avatar? If yes,
then why not assume that as an employee the intelligent avatar would
have rights, either contractual or under the Copyright Act, to the
intellectual property they created?98
Other legal theories may also be useful for thinking about the rights
of virtual avatars. For example, could the intellectual property created
by avatars be considered a joint work between the avatar, programmer or
avatars owner?99 The Copyright Act defines a joint work as “a work
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole.”100 The programmer’s contribution to the joint work
would be the algorithms to direct the avatar’s behavior and the
programming required to create the avatar’s appearance.101 The owner’s
contribution would be the input directing the avatar’s output. The

96. See generally Darin Glasser, Copyrights on Computer-Generated Works: Whom, If
Anyone, Do We Reward? 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 24 (2001).
97. Currently, software may be licensed by one party to another to assist that party in many
tasks that have traditionally been performed by humans, such as the production of documents and
the manipulation of symbols and data.
98. Even if an intelligent avatar was deemed an employee, one would then have to determine
whether the work was a work for hire under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201. As with
humans, could avatars “contract out” of their employee duties to an employer? Here it is interesting
to note that “intelligent software agents” are contracting independently of humans in the domain of
electronic commerce; see Dodd & Hernandez, supra note 25; see generally Kerr, supra note 40.
99. See generally Tarcisio Queiroz Cerqueira, Some Common and Civil Thoughts on
Computer Generated Works, available at http://www.camera-e.net/-uploadCOMMON%20AND%2
0CIVIL%20THOUGHTS.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2005); see generally Samuelson, supra note 70.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (defining a “joint work”); see also Samuelson, supra note 70 at
1221.
101. But see sources cited supra note 38 (containing citations to self-learning systems).
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avatar’s contribution would vary, from significant to less meaningful
depending on the amount of input supplied by the programmer or owner
and the algorithms used to design the avatars. For example, if using
techniques such as neural nets or genetic algorithms, the avatar could
make significant contributions to a joint work.
For a joint work under the Copyright Act, the authors are
considered co-owners of a single copy of the work. Thus, if a joint work
was found, the programmer and avatar would each own an undivided
interest in the copyright. But what if the avatar is learning within the
virtual environment, and creates an output completely independent of the
programmer’s original effort? Should the court then view the avatar’s
output as an original work of authorship, or as a derivative of the
programmer’s original input? If so, who would the court consider to be
the author of the avatar’s output? Would the court deem the work
original if created by an avatar, and thus award a copyright to the avatar?
Under the Copyright Act, copyright subsists “in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”102 For a work to be original, the author must have engaged in
some intellectual endeavor of their own, and not just have copied from a
preexisting source, and the work must exhibit a minimal amount of
creativity.103 In the context of intelligent avatars, important issues are
whether an avatar can be considered to be an author, and if so, whether
the “works” of an avatar can be considered original. If avatars create
original works of authorship eligible for copyright protection, who will
the court determine to be the author of such works, the original
programmer(s), the employer of the programmer, the avatar’s owner, the
avatar, or as discussed above, will the work be considered a joint work
under the copyright law with multiple owners?104 The issue of whether
computer-generated output can be eligible for copyright protection has
received some attention in the past, with some commentators concluding
that a computer can be an author under the Copyright Act,105 and some

102. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2005).
103. Id.
104. See Samuelson, supra note 70; see generally Tal Vigderson, Hamlet II: The Sequel? The
Rights of Authors vs. Computer-Generated “Read-Alike” Works, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 401 (1994)
(discussing whether a romance novel written by an AI that was programmed to mimic author
Jacqueline Susann might inappropriately copy Susann’s style).
105. See generally Karl F. Milde, Jr., Can a Computer be an “Author” or an “Inventor?,” 51
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 378 (1969).
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commentators reaching the alternative conclusion.106
The process of creating a work involving a virtual avatar involves
the efforts of a programmer to create the avatar, the software used to
create the avatar’s appearance and behavior, and a computer to store the
code used to design the avatar. The software can consist of rules that
allow little or no autonomous actions by the avatar, or can consist of
neural nets or genetic algorithms which allow the avatar to learn and act
in significantly different ways than the original set of parameters used to
design the avatar. In order to determine whether an avatar can be an
author and receive copyright protections for its works, the interests of
the programmer, employer, and avatar will need to be addressed. For
example, it would be difficult to argue that an avatar with no ability to
make decisions on its own, or perform in the capacity as an employee
could be considered an author under § 101 of the Copyright Act.107
Granting authorship rights to an intelligent avatar will be difficult
under the current copyright law.108 One reason is enforceability of the
rights enumerated under the Copyright Act. Would an avatar be capable
of enforcing such rights, or have standing to initiate an action?109
Further, awarding copyright protection to an avatar would imply that the
avatar can have ideas that led to original works of authorship.110 What
separates avatars that act with intelligence111 from avatars which are
designed to perform a limited set of actions strictly under human control
is the ability of the “intelligent avatar” to apply existing knowledge to a
new set of facts or problems.112 Here the relevant inquiry into whether
the avatar’s actions translate into an original work of authorship is
whether the avatar is simply reinterpreting another author’s work, and
whether the avatars output is completely dependant on the programmer’s

106. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1993)
(concluding that AIs should not be authors because computers need no incentive to produce their
output); see Samuelson, supra note 70 (arguing against copyright protection for artificially
intelligent entities).
107. The owner of the avatar might argue that the avatar is neither an independent contractor
creating work on her own time, nor an employee working for the owner.
108. See Samuelson, supra note 70; Milde, supra note 105.
109. Rothblatt, infra note 372; REGAN, infra note 352; see generally Evan H. Farr,
Copyrightability of Computer-Created Works, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 63, 65 (1989).
110. See Butler, supra note 91, at 726-33.
111. That is, avatars designed with genetic algorithms or neural nets which allow a
rudimentary level of learning and autonomous behavior to occur. See generally Karnow, supra note
39.
112. See generally Bob Ryan, AI's Identity Crisis, BYTE 239, 240 (1001) (describing Turing's
conjecture that in time computing machines by manipulating symbols could think).
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instructions.
The standard for what constitutes an original work under the
Copyright Act has been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.113
Discussing the requirement for originality, the Supreme Court found that
telephone white page listings did not satisfy the originality requirement
because they lacked minimal creativity.114 The Court noted that the
author’s “selection and arrangement of the facts could not be so
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.”115 As the
Court discussed, “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only
that the work was independently created by the author, and that it
possesses some minimal degree of creativity.”116 Under this analysis, the
Court may determine that an avatar using algorithms is simply
performing in a mechanical or routine manner. In this case, the avatar
could not receive copyright protection for its work. However, what about
an avatar with the capability to learn and respond to events in the virtual
environment? In this case, the problem-solving would be far from
mechanical or routine. Even so, before copyright protection is awarded
to the output of an avatar, the work must be deemed original. This does
not, in itself, seem to be an obstacle for an intelligent avatar. However,
the avatar would have to be deemed an author. This is a more difficult
bar to overcome. Interestingly, there is some precedent for the assertion
that an “author” need not be a human being. As noted above, under the
work for hire doctrine a corporation may be deemed the author of a
work,117 although this conclusion seems to conflict with some case law.
Analysis of whether a nonhuman can be an author has been
addressed previously in a Ninth Circuit case.118 This case involved a
questionable claim that a superior being authored a particular work, but
for purposes here, the analysis the court used to decide the case offers an
interesting insight into how the law might view authorship rights for
intelligent avatars. The case involved a copyright dispute between
113. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
114. Id. at 362.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 345.
117. See generally Jisuk Woo, Genius with Minimal Creativity? The Continuity of and
Transformation of the "Authorship" Construct on Copyright Case Law Regarding Computer
Software, 15 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 109, 116 (2004). See U.S.C. 17 § 101 (1976); 17 U.S.C. §
201(b) (1976); see also Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497 (2nd Cir. 1969), superceded
by statute, The Copyright Act, Pub. L. 94-553, Title 1, § 101. In Scherr, Justice Friendly stated in
his dissent that “in the Constitution and in the Copyright Act, the emphasis is on protecting the
‘author’ and that any principle depriving him of copyright and vesting this in another without his
express assent must thus be narrowly confined.” Id. at 502.
118. Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997).
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parties who believed the copyrighted work, the Urantia Book, was
authored by celestial beings and transcribed, compiled and collected by
“mere mortals.”119 The plaintiff, Urantia Foundation, claimed that the
defendant Maaherra infringed the Foundation’s copyright when she
distributed a computerized version of the Urantia book on disk.120
Maaherra conceded copying, so the issue before the court was whether
the Foundation owned a valid copyright in the book.121 Both parties
believed that the words in the book were “authored” by non-human
spiritual beings described in terms such as the “Divine Counselor,” the
“Chief of the Corps of Superuniverse Personalities,” and the “Chief of
the Archangels of Nebadon.”122 These spiritual entities were claimed to
have delivered the teachings that were eventually assembled in the
Book, through a patient of a Chicago psychiatrist.123
A threshold issue in this case was whether the work, because it was
claimed to embody the words of celestial beings rather than human
beings, was copyrightable at all.124 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Television Service Co., Inc., the Court in discussing a threshold
requirement for copyright said, “To qualify for copyright protection, a
work must be original to the author.”125 The core statute from the
Copyright Act provides: “[C]opyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, . . .
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”126
As the Court reasoned, “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright,
means only that the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity.”127
119. Id. at 956.
120. Id. at 958.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 956.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 958; see also Oliver v. Saint Germain Found., 41 F.Supp. 296 (S.D.Cal. 1941). In
Oliver, the plaintiff’s religious text proclaimed that the facts contained in the text had come straight
from a spirit, and that the spirit was the author of the history in the text. Id. at 297. The plaintiff
(unsuccessfully) claimed copyright protection in the divine revelations themselves, and in the
methods of spiritual communication, rather than in the plaintiff’s specific selection or arrangement
of these divine revelations. Id. at 299. The defendant in Oliver had not copied that arrangement and
selection, but simply had written another text using the same divine “facts.” Id. The court in Oliver
made it clear that, had the claim been that the selection and arrangement of the divine revelations
had been infringed, the plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim might have had merit. Id.
125. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
126. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
127. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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Maaherra claimed that there can be no valid copyright in the book
because it lacked the requisite ingredient of human creativity, and that
therefore the book was not a “work of authorship” within the meaning of
the Copyright Act.128 Nowhere in the copyright laws, is there an express
requirement for “human” authorship, and considerable controversy has
arisen in recent years over the copyrightability of computer-generated
works.129 The Urantia court argued that the copyright law does not
protect the “creations of divine beings,” but that the copyright laws
protect some element of human creativity.130 The court stated, “At the
very least, for a worldly entity to be guilty of infringing a copyright, that
entity must have copied something created by another worldly entity.”131
For copyright purposes, the Urantia court reasoned, a work is
copyrightable if copyright is claimed by the first human beings who
compiled, selected, coordinated, and arranged the Urantia teachings, “in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original
work of authorship.”132 The court said that the party who was
responsible for the creation of a tangible literary form that could be read
by others, could claim copyright for themselves as “authors.”133 They
were responsible for the religious revelations appearing “‘in such a way’
as to render the work as a whole original.”134 Thus, notwithstanding the
Urantia Book’s claimed non-human origin, the papers in the form in
which they were originally organized and compiled by the members of
the Contact Commission were at least partially the product of human
creativity.135 The court reasoned that the papers did not belong to that
“narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking
or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent.”136 From the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis in Urantia, one can summarize the decision as calling for a
human author to find a copyrightable work even if the author did not
128. Urantia, 114 F.3d at 958.
129. Samuelson, supra note 70, at 1197 (“While Congress may never have anticipated machine
authorship, the statute itself says nothing about what kind of being one has to be in order to qualify
as an author.”); see generally Miller, supra note 106, at 1042-72.
130. Urantia, 114 F.3d at 958.
131. Id. at 958. It would be interesting to consider whether an intelligent avatar would
constitute a “worldy entity” under the courts reasoning.
132. Id. at 958; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (defining a “compilation”); see 17 U.S.C. §
103 (1976) (providing that compilations are copyrightable). Under this logic, the user of the avatar
would be deemed the author.
133. Urantia, 114 F.3d at 960.
134. Id. at 958.
135. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991); see also
Urantia, 114 F.3d at 958.
136. Urantia, 114 F.3d at 958.
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conceive of the original work. However, under § 201(b) of the copyright
statute, a non-human entity such as a corporation, can be deemed the
author of a work. This apparent conflict in the law will be even further
revealed as artificial entities gain more intelligence, self-program, and
make decisions independent from any human. Could an avatar be
registered as a corporation, and thus be deemed the author of a work for
hire, such as the work of another avatar?
One obstacle to gaining copyright protection is determining
whether the avatar is self-aware that it created the work.137 If the avatar
is not self-aware, it can be argued that its output is merely a digital
reinterpretation of what it has been programmed to do. Thus, it is not
exhibiting any level of creativity required for copyright protection. In
this case, if copying were found, the avatar’s owner, and not the avatar,
would be liable for copyright infringement.138 Under copyright law, in
order for a human author to be liable for copyright infringement, a
significant amount of copying would have to be found.139 In the future it
may be argued that a virtual avatar that is self-aware and producing
creative works of authorship is no different than a human author- liable
for copyright infringement if a significant amount of copying is found;
or producing a copyrightable work, if the requisite level of creativity
exists in the work, and no copying occurred.140
One issue that has impacted the debate over whether the output of
virtual avatars should be eligible for copyright protection is the lack of
human-like performance by avatars.141 That is, in many cases, virtual
avatars and software agents have performed tasks within a narrow range
as defined by a human owner; without showing any creativity beyond
the original parameters of the software used to create the avatar.
However, recent advances in neural networks have led to works that are
different in nature from conventional computer-generated works.142 The
human owner of a neural network can be quite removed from the
authorship process and output of the neural network.143 Procedures used
by neural nets mimic human brain processes, and are relevant for the
issue of whether the avatar is aware of its own creations. One
137. See generally Barfield, supra note 34 (discussing personhood rights for intelligent
entities).
138. See generally Karnow, supra note 39, at 181-83.
139. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
140. See generally Cerqueira, supra note 99.
141. See generally Barfield, supra note 34.
142. Donald L. Wenskay, Neural Networks: A Prescription for Effective Protection, 8
COMPUTER LAWYER 12 (1991).
143. See generally Glasser, supra note 96.
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commentator has argued that the issue of copyrighting neural network
weights confronts the intelligent entity-authorship issue head-on.144 On
this point, the Copyright Office has already registered a set of neural
network weights.145 Note that avatars may be designed using neural
networks and that the structure of the neural network may change as the
avatar learns. Thus, one can wonder whether the output of an intelligent
avatar operating using a neural network would be eligible for copyright
protection since the weights assigned to the neural networks can be
registered.146 That is, neural network architectures embodied in
conventional software are copyrightable, just as are other forms of
software. Interconnection weights derived by training a neural network
represent a new and valuable form of intellectual property, and courts
are typically inclined to protect economic rights.147 Therefore, copyright
law seems to offer one possible means to protect neural network weights
and therefore the output of virtual avatars.148
In the area of creative writing, according to one commentator,
“computer technology is advancing to the point where a computer may
soon be able to generate works in the style of any author that it is
programmed to duplicate.”149 In one example, a program was written to
write in the style of best selling author Jacqueline Susann. The result
was a published book, Just This Once.150 To create this work, the
programmer used two of Ms. Susann’s novels, Valley of the Dolls151 and
Once Is Not Enough,152 to extract rules which represented the author’s
style.153 The rules, numbering in the thousands, were input into a
computer to produce the tone and plot of the book.154
It has been argued that current copyright law is not equipped to deal
144. Wenskay, supra note 142.
145. Id. (discussing a Wall Street Journal article, October 4, 1990, at B5, on the copyright
registration of a neural network).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Vigderson, supra note 104, at 402 (discussing whether a romance novel written by an AI
that was programmed to mimic author Jacqueline Susann might inappropriately copy Susann’s
style).
150. SCOTT FRENCH, JUST THIS ONCE (1994) (French invested eight years and $50,000 to use
artificial intelligence techniques to generate a novel in the style of Jacqueline Susann).
151. JACQUELINE SUSANN, VALLEY OF THE DOLLS (1966).
152. JACQUELINE SUSANN, ONCE IS NOT ENOUGH (1973).
153. John Boudreau, A Romance Novel with Byte; Author Teams Up with Computer to Write
Book in Steamy Style of Jacqueline Susann, L.A. TIMES at E6 (Aug. 11, 1993).
154. Vigderson, supra note 104 (French identified 200 idiosyncrasies in Susann’s writing.
These idiosyncrasies related to language, character, and action. The rules French programmed were
designed to teach the 200 idiosyncrasies to the computer).
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with the potential legal ramifications of such computer-generated
works.155 Copyright law protects the expression of an idea, but not the
idea itself.156 And protection extends to works fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.157 Protection does not extend to procedures,
processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or
discoveries.158 Once an avatar gains intelligence, to make a claim for
copyright protection, it must use more creativity in producing an output
than a standard procedure or method. If the writing style of an author is
characterized as a system or method of operation, then it may not be
protectable.159 To determine if a writer’s style can be protected, it must
first be defined. In copyright terms, this is referred to as “dissection.”160
In order to duplicate the style of Jacqueline Susann, the programmer
wrote thousands of computer-coded rules relating to how characters
interacted, all based on Ms. Susann’s works.161
In the above example, the programmer admitted using Susann’s
style, reducing her style to thousands of rules equaling thousands of lines
of computer code.162 Most human authors create works by improving on
another’s style, and generally such improvements are copyrightable.163
However, as noted by one commentator, “when a computer is
programmed to specifically imitate an author’s style, the human
interpretive element is removed.”164 If we assume an avatar with
artificial intelligence has developed to the point where it can interpret an
author’s style and then create a new work based on that style, and if we
also assume that no human was involved in the work being written, still
something worthy of copyright protection has been created, but who
should receive a copyright for this work?165 If an artificially intelligent
entity cannot be the author of a work, the choice for authorship is either

155. Glasser, supra note 96.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1976).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
159. See generally Vigderson, supra note 104.
160. See Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (Altai enunciated
the abstraction test from Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied 282 U.S. 902 (1931) (upon any work a great number of patterns of increasing generality will
fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out). See also Brown Bag Software v.
Symantec Corp.,960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992) (endorsing "analytic dissection" of computer
programs in order to isolate protectable expression), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992).
161. Vigderson, supra note 104, at 405.
162. Id. at 405.
163. Id. at 406.
164. Id. Perhaps the human interpretative elements can be found in the software?
165. Id.
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the programmer or user of the software. If the user simply turns on the
computer and runs the program, no requisite level of creativity for
copyright is shown. As for the programmers rights, the right to copyright
a program is clear, but what about the programmer’s rights to the output
of the program? If the program is not run by the programmer, but by
another person, or by the avatar itself, the programmer would not be the
person who “fixed” the work, nor embodied it in a tangible medium of
expression, both requirements for copyright. Therefore, when an
intelligent avatar creates a work on its own, determining who the author
should be is problematic.
In discussing who should be the author of a work generated by an
intelligent avatar, the issue of whether the avatar is creating a derivative
work in copying the style of a human author should be considered. The
Copyright Act166 defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or
more preexisting works.”167 If Just This Once, a computer-generated
work, is viewed as a derivative work,168 then it could be covered under
an expansive interpretation of copyright law. However, if an author
recognized that his writing style was copied by a virtual avatar but that
the words had changed such that no case for copying could be made,
then the author would have no cause of action for copyright
infringement because under a traditional infringement analysis there
would be no substantial similarity. Nimmer defines authorship as “a
sine qua non for any claim of copyright . . . the person claiming
copyright must either himself be the author, or he must have succeeded
to the rights of the author.”169 The Ninth Circuit expressed a narrow
interpretation of a derivative work in Litchfield v. Spielberg.170 In
Spielberg, the plaintiffs argued that substantial similarity was not a
requirement to find that an infringing work was derivative.171 The
Spielberg court soundly rejected this argument, stating that substantial
similarity was necessary.172 It seems reasonable that the “substantial
166. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
168. A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations,
or other modifications which as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative
work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
169. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.01 [A], at 5-3
(1993).
170. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1052 (1988).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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similarity” standard could also be used to analyze the work of virtual
avatars.
IV. DESIGN AND USE OF VIRTUAL AVATARS
This section presents various intellectual property schemes that can
be used to protect the rights of the virtual avatar’s owner, and given legal
rights for virtual avatars, the rights of the intelligent avatar itself. As a
basic principle, one needs to consider that a virtual avatar is more than
the graphical image that appears in a virtual environment; an avatar also
includes the software and algorithms used to design the avatar. Under
the Copyright Act, the visual image of the avatar appearing in the virtual
environment can receive protection as a pictorial character.173 However,
characters may also be created with words, in which case they receive
protection under the Copyright Act as a literary work.174 Under the
copyright statute, the protection of literary characters normally is
distinguished from the protection of pictorial characters.175 Due to the
unique nature of virtual avatars, existing in the form of software and in
the form of an image appearing in a virtual environment, avatars may be
eligible for dual protection as a pictorial character and as a literary
character.
The less common way of thinking about copyright protection for
virtual avatars is as a literary character. Support for the argument that an
avatar could be protected as a literary work is provided by Universal
City Studios v. Reimerdes, where the court held that code is eligible to
receive First Amendment protection as speech.176 The court held that
code is a means of expressing ideas, and thus “the First Amendment
must be considered before its dissemination may be prohibited or
regulated.”177 If software is used to describe the visual appearance of a
virtual avatar, how it reacts in a virtual environment, even its possible
range of speech, then software may be protectable as speech under the
First Amendment. Based on the decision in Universal City Studios,178
one could argue that an avatar could receive protection under the

173. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(5) (1976).
174. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(1) (1976).
175. See generally Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
176. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
177. Id. See generally Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v. U.S.
Dept. of State, 922 F.Supp 1426, 1436 (N.D.Cal. 1996) (first Amendment extends to source code);
see Karn v. U.S. Dept. of State, 925 F.Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1996) (assuming First Amendment
protection extends to source code).
178. University City Studios, 111 F.Supp.2d 294.
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Copyright Act as a literary character given that the code used to design
the avatar could be protectable as speech. Also supporting this argument
are cases involving cartoon, movie, or television characters; the Ninth
Circuit has been willing to find copyright protection when the character
at issue has a visual representation, as well as a personality described by
a word or character line.179 Therefore, the more the virtual avatar
displays a unique character, the more likely the court is to find the avatar
to be more than idea, but expression deserving of copyright
protection.180
That code may be protected under the first Amendment as speech
has significance for the rights of virtual avatars should they continue to
get smarter. In Universal City Studios,181 the court concluded that
communications do not lose constitutional status as speech simply
because they are expressed in the language of computer code.182 This
conclusion begs the question of whether the software used to design the
avatar itself is protected under the First Amendment. Although the
Universal City Studios case did not deal with the issue of whether the
First Amendment right applied to virtual avatars, the case does provide
insight as to what rights may someday be awarded intelligent virtual
avatars, even suggesting that they may receive Constitutional rights.183
The increased complexity of visual images has led one
commentator to conclude that the situation existing in many courts has
resulted in the convergence of distinct bodies of law, such as copyright,
trademark and unfair competition, into a new body of law formulated
solely to protect characters.184 According to this commentator, the
interplay of many factors has resulted in this convergence of the law.185
These factors include: (1) the profits that can be made from the
commercialization of characters, such as virtual avatars who are able to
take on a life of their own in settings that differ from those in which the
avatar was originally designed to inhabit;186 (2) the ability of avatars to
179. See Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002.); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.,
256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
180. See Seals-McClellan v. Dreamworks, Inc., 120 Fed.Appx. 3 (9th Cir. 2004); Murray Hill
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century, 361 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2004).
181. Universal City Studios, 111 F.Supp.2d 294.
182. Id. at 327.
183. Id.
184. Michael Todd Helfand, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The Convergence
of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 623, 641 (1992).
185. Id. at 628.
186. Id.; see generally Derral Fralish, Crystal Mario, Elaine Mitchell, Matthew Peterson &
Lisa Smith, Update on Virtual Reality: Avatars and 3D-Chat, available at http://www.emory.edu/
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function as entertainment products that are recognized under federal,
state, and common law because they “suggest, if not clearly indicate,
origin” of the products or services which the avatar is associated with;
and (3) the quality that a virtual avatar through extended use, can lead
the public to relate to the character as being human.187
In the context of virtual avatars, the copyrightable expression of a
character is much more than just the character’s physical appearance. It
includes the specific name, physical appearance, and character traits of
that character. In Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc., the court noted that, in determining whether a character
in a second work infringed a cartoon character, “courts have generally
considered not only the visual resemblance but also the totality of the
characters’ attributes and traits.”188 A similar result was shown in
Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications.189 Here, the court found
that the character “Superman” was infringed in a competing comic book
publication featuring the character “Wonderman.”190 The court held that
the infringing work “appropriated the pictorial and literary details
embodied in” the copyrights protecting Superman.191 To summarize the
above courts’ decisions for virtual avatars, a copyright infringement
action will involve more than just a showing of the physical similarity
between two virtual avatars; the court will also consider the range of
behaviors exhibited by the avatars, and even the avatar’s digital
speech.192
One of the more difficult problems of applying copyright law
analysis and protection to virtual avatars will be to ascertain how such
protection will be extended to protect a particular virtual avatar after that
avatar has taken on a life of its own and no longer exists in the original
context in which it first appeared. Will copyright protection be lost if the
virtual avatar’s appearance has changed? For virtual avatars designed
using genetic algorithms, once they have mutated their appearance and
behavior, will they still be eligible for copyright protection? In order to
ascertain whether a virtual avatar might be entitled to copyright
protection, the courts likely will follow the “character delineation” test

BUSINESS/et/avatar (last visited June 9, 2005) (discussing how avatars may be used in
advertisement and promotion).
187. See generally Helfand, supra note 184, at 628.
188. Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Cos, Inc.,720 F.2d 231, 241 (2nd Cir. 1983).
189. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d. 432 (2nd Cir. 1940).
190. Id. at 433-34.
191. Id. at 433.
192. See generally Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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which is used to analyze the copyrightability of graphical images.193
Under this test, the critical issue is whether the avatar is sufficiently and
distinctively delineated so that it warrants protection.194 Because
copyright law does not protect ideas from infringement, but instead only
protects the expression of those ideas, courts do not protect character
types.195 Therefore, while a court would likely not extend copyright
protection to a virtual avatar possessing super powers, the courts will
likely extend copyright protection to a specifically delineated “super
powered” virtual avatar, without bestowing a monopoly on the mere
character of a “super avatar.” Based on this conclusion, a good way to
protect a virtual avatar under copyright law will be to ensure that the
avatar’s appearance and personality are specific and unique. Past
characters that have received copyright protection have displayed
consistent, widely identifiable, traits.196
V. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY FOR VIRTUAL AVATARS
What if the appearance of an avatar resembles that of a famous
personality and is used for commercial gain in a virtual environment? If
the avatar resembling a famous person is used for commercial purposes,
the person whose image is appropriated may have a claim for damages
under the right of publicity doctrine.197 The right of publicity prevents
the unauthorized commercial use of an individual’s name, likeness, or
other recognizable aspect of one’s persona.198 It gives an individual the
exclusive right to license the use of their identity for commercial
promotion.199 Thus far, the right of publicity cause of action has been
used to protect humans, but not the likeness of a nonhuman character.
For example, in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., a nonhuman entity was found to be a sufficient likeness to Vanna White to
support a right of publicity claim.200 Given that the White decision
193. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 900 F.Supp. 1287
(C.D.Cal. 1995); Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDK, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11109 (C.D.Cal.
Apr. 25, 1989).
194. See generally Metro-Goldwyn, 900 F.Supp. at 1296.
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
196. See, e.g., Toho Co., Ltd. v. William Morrow and Co., Inc., 33 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1215
(C.D.Cal. 1998) (Godzilla); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F.Supp. at 1297 (James Bond); Anderson,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11109 (Rocky Balboa).
197. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149
Cal.App.3d 409 (1983).
198. Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005).
199. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
200. Id.
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involved a nonhuman character in the analysis, the court’s reasoning in
White begs the question, could it be possible that some day the right of
publicity doctrine could be expanded to protect a virtual avatar should
the avatar gain in intelligence and contribute to its own physical and
personality identity?
“In the United States, the right of publicity is largely protected by
state common or statutory law.”201 Of the states that recognize a right of
publicity, many do not recognize a right by that name but protect it as
part of the right of privacy.202 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
recognizes four types of invasion of privacy: intrusion, appropriation of
name or likeness, unreasonable publicity and false light.203 Under the
Restatement’s formulation, the invasion of the right of publicity is most
similar to the unauthorized appropriation of one’s name or likeness.204
According to the Legal Information Institute,
[i]n other states the right of publicity is protected through the law of
unfair competition. Actions for the tort of misappropriation or for a
wrongful attempt to ‘pass off’ the product as endorsed or produced by
the individual help to protect the right of publicity . . . The Federal
Lanham Act can also provide protection where a person’s identity is
used to falsely advertise a product or designate its origin.205

The White decision provides some insight as to how the court may
view right of publicity claims brought by intelligent avatars or the
owners of avatars. In White, Vanna White sued Samsung for creating an
ad that included a robot in a blond wig and fancy dress standing on a
game show set similar to the set used on the television show “Wheel of
Fortune.”206 The Ninth Circuit rejected a parody defense asserted by
Samsung because the ad’s spoof of Vanna White was secondary to its
main purpose; to sell Samsung VCR’s.207 If avatars were to receive legal
rights, under the White decision, the use of an avatar that is not an exact
replica of another avatar, even one that is an obvious parody of the other
avatar, could be actionable if the other elements of a right of publicity
claim were met. The court’s decision in White also implies that a virtual

201. Legal Information Institute, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/publicity.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005) (hereinafter Legal Information Institute). See Cal.Civ. Code § 3344
(California’s Right of Publicity Statute).
202. See generally Legal Information Institute, supra note 201.
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1976).
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C, comments a & b (1976).
205. Legal Information Institute, supra note 201; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) (Lanham Act).
206. White, 971 F.2d 1395.
207. Id. at 1401-02.
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avatar could be found to have violated a human’s right of publicity.
Another case with relevance for virtual avatars involved a voice
sound-alike. In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit found that a
sound-alike of the actress and singer Bette Midler used in a commercial
was a violation of Midler’s right of publicity.208 This decision has
relevance for digital speech that could be produced by a virtual avatar.
To avoid a right of publicity claim, the avatar should not be designed to
copy the voice of a famous person (although this is technically possible).
Further, could the court find a right of publicity violation if an avatar’s
voice was copied, assuming the avatar had gained celebrity status, and
the copied voice was used for commercial gain? A major issue for such a
claim would be whether the avatar’s recognized voice had commercial
value. In Pesina v. Midway Manufacturing Company, the plaintiff
brought an action against a video game manufacturer challenging use of
his image on the home version of Mortal Kombat and Mortal Kombat II
(he had been hired to model for characters of the arcade version).209 The
defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted and the court
held that the alleged use of the martial artist’s name, likeness, or persona
did not violate his common law right of publicity because there was no
evidence that prior to his association with the game, his name, likeness
or persona had commercial value.210 Also, there was no evidence that his
likeness was recognizable by the games’ users.211 Therefore, under a
right of publicity theory, avatars that lack celebrity status leading to
commercial value, may not receive protection if copied.212
VI. PROTECTION OF VIRTUAL AVATARS UNDER TRADEMARK AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
Other avenues for the protection of the rights of the owner of the
virtual avatar may include trademark and unfair competition law.
Federal, state and common law protection will protect the avatar from
being used by another party without authorization when the avatar
functions as a form of identification and is recognized by the public as
208. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
209. Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40 (N.D.Ill. 1996).
210. Id. at 42.
211. Id.
212. But some avatars have already gained notoriety. See, e.g., John Alderman, From Earth to
Avatars, WIRED NEWS, available at http://wired-vig.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,16439-,00.html
(last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (discussing an avatar beauty contest); see generally Sean Egen, The
History of Avatars, available at http://www.oddcast.com/home/news/2005/06202005-3.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2005). There could also be other causes of action directed against the infringer by
the owner of the avatar.
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paired to a product.213 This protection could prevent the exact
duplication of the trademark owner’s avatar, or the imitation of that
avatar where the likely result would be to cause public confusion,
mistake or deception with regard to the source of the products or
services that carry the likeness of the avatar.214 Trademark law will not
permit a graphic character to be trademarked solely for its own
protection. However, it does permit the character’s name and likeness to
be trademarked when the function of that trademark is to indicate the
source of the products and services bearing that mark.215
As may be expected, there will be advantages and disadvantages to
protecting a virtual avatar as a trademark. On the positive side, to obtain
a trademark, the avatar will not have to include the originality attributes
that are required under copyright law.216 In addition, in order to prove
trademark infringement, the trademark owner will not need to prove that
the infringer had access to the avatar, as is required under copyright
law,217 but only that the mark was used by a party other than the owner
of the mark without permission. Finally, the longer term of protection,
potentially perpetual just as long as the registration requirements are
fulfilled, the mark is not abandoned, or the mark loses its status as a
trademark, can be valuable and profitable.218 This is especially true for
successful and highly marketable graphic characters, such as many of
the Disney and Warner Brothers characters. On the negative side,
federal trademark protection for an avatar can be costly.219 This will be
especially true if the avatar is extensively used or licensed for use in
multiple media formats, or in merchandising programs for many
different categories of products and/or services. In addition, because
trademark protection is territorial, the avatar serving as a mark220 may

213. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § § 13, 16, 17.
214. See generally Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2000) overruled on
other grounds by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
215. Lloyd L. Rich, Protection of Fictional Characters, available at http://www.publaw.com/
fiction.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
769 (1992).
216. The originality requirement for copyright is expressed in Feist, 499 U.S. at 346; 17 U.S.C.
§ 101; and U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
217. See generally U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Basics (Circular 1), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
218. See Rich, supra note 215.
219. Id.
220. If an avatar gains in intelligence, could it then serve as a trademark? The subject matter of
trademark covers “any word, name, symbol, or device,” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Could an avatar
that produced its own output serve as either a symbol or device? It seems that an avatar that gained
legal rights would not be appropriate subject matter for trademark law.
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need to be registered in countries other than the United States to provide
the maximum degree of protection.221 Because neural nets and genetic
algorithms allow an avatar to learn and change their appearance, and any
changes in the appearance of the avatar could destroy the original
trademark protection, additional trademark registrations may be
necessary to ensure that the current appearance of the avatar remains
protected.
Another legal theory which may be used to protect an avatar is
unfair competition law.222 Unfair competition laws involve a variety of
different causes of action that primarily fall into three categories: (1)
misrepresentation, (2) sponsorship, and (3) misappropriation.223
Misrepresentation occurs when a party represents that a particular
character is associated with their product or service, when, in reality, it is
not.224 Sponsorship occurs when a party indicates that a particular
character has endorsed its product or service when it has not.225
Misappropriation, which may be most relevant for the protection of
virtual avatars, may occur when a party steals another’s avatar in order
to associate it with their product or service.226 Therefore, when one
brings an unfair competition action, the injured party is claiming that
their character has been wrongly associated with another party’s product,
service, person, company, or idea.227 If such misuse of a graphic
character occurs, and it is determined under the reasonable person
standard228 that the graphic character had been misrepresented, used
falsely as a sponsor, or misappropriated, then the party engaged in such
misuse could be found liable for trademark infringement.229 Most courts
221. See, e.g., Nisha Vosa, USINFO.STATE.GOV, International Policy and Accords,
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/accords.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005)
(discussing treaties related to international intellectual property rights); Paul E. Salmon, A SHORT
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL IPR TREATIES, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intel
prp/guide.htm (last visited May 14, 2006).
222. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
223. Rich, supra note 215.
224. See Mary LaFrance, When You Wish Upon a Dastar: Creative Provenance and the
Lanham Act, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 197 (2005).
225. See Joseph R. Dreitler, The Tiger Woods Case – Has the Sixth Circuit Abandoned
Trademark Law, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 38 AKRON L. REV. 337 (2005).
226. See Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: The Limitation of State “Laboratories” and
the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363
(2005). For an example of a real world case dealing with images, see Kellogg, 209 F.3d 562.
227. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
228. See generally Joseph Gibbons Llewellyn, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral
and the Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 187 (2005).
229. See generally Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995).
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have recognized trademark protection for graphic characters and have
found trademark infringement liability under both trademark and unfair
competition law.230 Therefore, if avatars are used for commercial
purposes, in addition to copyright protection, other claims to protect
avatars can be brought, including right of publicity and trademark or
unfair competition. An example of case law in this area is Walt Disney
Productions v. Air Pirates,231 where the court appeared to commingle
copyright and trademark infringement criteria by stating that the Disney
characters used by the defendants had “achieved a high degree of
‘recognition’ and ‘identification’” and that these elements helped make
the characters protectable under copyright law.232
VII. TECHNIQUES TO MANIPULATE THE VISUAL APPEARANCE OF
VIRTUAL AVATARS
There are various ways that a digital image can be altered. Some
of the commonly used techniques to alter the original design and
appearance of an image include colorization, letterboxing, panning and
scanning, lexiconning, morphing, deletion of material, and the digital
replacement of the full image or some aspect of the image.233 The
question posed in this section of the article is whether such alternations,
if made to a virtual avatar, can be actionable.
A. Colorization
Colorization has been used extensively to add color to black and
white film, and could also be used to alter the color characteristics of
virtual avatars and virtual environments. Colorization, in the context of
film, is a process that matches selected colors with the grey-scale234 of
the black-and-white original image and then alters the image frame by
frame based on the colors selected.235 Specifically, an art director
230. Fisher v. Star Co., 132 N.E. 133 (1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921) (the cartoon
characters Mutt and Jeff were protected by the court under trademark and unfair competition
principles which found the Star Company liable for their unauthorized use of the characters).
231. Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (1978).
232. Helfand, supra note 184, at 643-45.
233. Janine V. McNally, Congressional Limits on Technological Alterations to Film: The
Public Interest and the Artists’ Moral Right, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 129, 132-33 (1990).
234. Dan Renberg, The Money of Color: Film Colorization and the 100th Congress, 11
HASTINGS COMMUN. & ENT. L.J. 391, 394 (1989).
235. McNally, supra note 233, at 132-33; see also James Thomas Duggan & Neil V. Pennella,
The Case for Copyrights in Colorized Versions of Public Domain Feature Films, 34 J. COPY. SOCY
333, 336 (1987) (the colors in a black-and-white film are represented by blacks, whites, and greys.
A computer scans a videotape of the black-and-white film and determines what true colors should
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chooses a “key” frame and selects the colors for each part of that frame.
This key frame is used as a standard for all the other frames in a
particular scene.236 The film’s “palette” is thus re-created and a computer
electronically overlays the new color scheme onto a videotape copy of
the film.237 Given that virtual avatars exist as digital images, the color
characteristics of avatars can be changed with standard paint packages.
To colorize an image, the colorist may assign one of over approximately
50,000 hues to each of the pixels that comprise the given frame.238 Once
the frame has been colorized, the computer monitors each object as it
moves from frame to frame until the scene changes.239 At the change of
the scene, the process is then repeated.240
In the context of colorization techniques, a basic question is
whether the colorization of an avatar or virtual environment scene would
be sufficiently original as to satisfy the Copyrights Act’s originality
requirement.241 In Feist, the Supreme Court held that the Intellectual
Property clause of the United States Constitution242 required that a work
be “original” to receive copyright protection.243 Although the level of
originality needed is not very high, in Feist it was determined that the
white pages of a phone book were not protectable because the selection
of the data (all customers in a geographic area) and the arrangement of
the data (in alphabetical order) were not sufficiently original as to come
under the protection of the Copyright Act.244 If read broadly, the Feist
decision would withhold copyright protection from certain works that
society has a clear interest in seeing created, but which do not possess
the sufficient amount of originality. In particular, a broad reading of
Feist would leave some colorized films245 without copyright protection;
similarly, a broad reading of Feist would also leave copyright protection
for colorized avatars and virtual environments unprotected..
The ability to colorize old black-and-white films has generated
be used to replace the grey-scale tones).
236. McNally, supra note 233, at 133.
237. Anne Marie Cook, The Colorization of Black and White Films: An Example of the Lack of
Substantive Protection for Art in the United States, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309, 323 (1988).
238. David J. Kohs, Paint Your Wagon—Please!: Colorization, Copyright, and the Search for
Moral Rights, 40 FED.COMM. L.J. 1, 4 (1988).
239. Id. at 4.
240. Id.
241. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (1976).
242. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
243. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
244. Id. at 364 -65.
245. Specifically, Feist may affect colorized versions of black and white films in the public
domain. See Feist, 499 U.S. 340.
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considerable controversy.246 Colorization of film is not that far removed
from the idea of changing the color characteristics of virtual
environments, as the avatars in virtual environments can serve as actors
in digital movies shown in virtual reality.247 Persons who oppose
colorization include film directors, screenwriters, and avid black-andwhite film fans. Opponents of colorization believe that colorization will
ruin the original filmmaker’s intent as captured on black-and-white
film.248 Using similar reasoning, changing the color characteristics of an
avatar or virtual environment may receive opposition from the virtual
world designers and users. Proponents of colorization technology
include colorization firms, as well as film copyright owners, who have
invested millions of dollars in this market with the hope of generating
large revenues from sales of colorized films in the television syndication
and home video markets.249 Under current law, an original filmmaker
may prevent colorization if she is the copyright owner.250 However, once
the filmmaker transfers her proprietary interests in the copyright, the
original filmmaker no longer retains control over the future disposition
of the film.251 This basic finding would also apply to virtual avatars and
virtual environments.
Generally, directors and screenwriters are employed on a work-forhire basis.252 Section 201 of the Copyright Act provides that the
copyright vests initially in the author of the work, but that in the case of
a work-for-hire, the employer is considered the author.253 As such, the
employer owns the copyright to the film, unless the creative author signs
a written agreement to the contrary.254 If a virtual avatar obtained workfor-hire status, without a contract to the contrary, the avatar’s employer
would have ownership rights as enumerated under the Copyright Act. In
246. Michael C. Penn, Colorization of Films: Painting a Moustache on the “Mona Lisa”‘? 58
U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 (1990).
247. Carlton Reeve, Presence in Virtual Theatre, available at http://www.eimc.brad.ac.uk/
research/presence.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2005); see also Televirtual, available at http://www.tele
virtual.com/ (last visited June 9, 2005).
248. Elise K. Bader, A Film of a Different Color: Copyright and the Colorization of Black and
White Films, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 497, 499 (1986).
249. Id. at 498.
250. Id. at 499.
251. Id.
252. Cook, supra note 237, at 325.
253. EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS: CASE MATERIALS, AND NOTES ON UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES, TRADEMARKS,
COPYRIGHTS, AND PATENTS 508 (3d. ed., 1986). Under the Copyright Act a work made for hire is
defined to include a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1976).
254. KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 253, at 508.
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the context of film, the copyright allows its owner to prevent the
unauthorized duplication of an original film as well as the unauthorized
creation of a derivative version of the same film.255
A derivative work is one that is substantially copied from a prior
work.256 Because the colorized version of a film is substantially copied
from the original black-and-white version, it is considered to be a
derivative of the original film. Therefore, the owner of the copyright to a
black-and-white film may preclude the conversion of the film into color
for the term of the copyright.257 A creative author, either one who is
hired on a work-for-hire basis or one who originally owned the
copyright and subsequently assigned his copyright to another, can
contract to prevent the copyright owner from altering his work.258 If the
author does so, the copyright owner would be precluded from colorizing
the film for the duration of the copyright.259 However, once the work
enters the public domain, any person would be free to colorize the film.
As long as courts narrowly construe the Feist260 decision, colorized films
should continue to receive copyright protection.261 For those artists who
base their selection of colors on personal taste or reasons other than
factual accuracy, colorized films should be able to demonstrate the
requisite level of originality; the same reasoning should also hold for the
colorization of avatars and virtual environments.
B. Letterboxing
This section of the article summarizes a few additional techniques
which can be used to alter the appearance of an avatar or virtual
environment. Letterboxing is the process by which a film retains its
original aspect ratio when it is viewed on television.262 In some cases,
255. Id. at 623
256. MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01, at 3-2 (1987); see
id. at § 3.06 (a derivative work is non-infringing if it is created pursuant to the consent of the
copyright owner of the underlying work or if it is based on a work in the public domain).
257. See generally Kohs, supra note 238, at 21.
258. See Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, 971 F.2d. 926 (2d Cir. 1992).
259. See generally Raphael Winick, Intellectual Property, Defamation and the Digital
Alteration of Visual Images, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 143 (1997).
260. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 340 (1991).
261. Many commentators believe that Feist was intended to check the expansion of copyright
to include numerical paging or alphabetical order. See generally Michael F. Finn, "Just the Facts
Ma'am": The effect of the Supreme Court's Decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephones
Service Co. on the Colorization of Black and White Films, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 859 (1003)
(discussing how the Court's interpretation of the Feist decision affects protection of colorized films).
As such, it is not improper to construe Feist narrowly.
262. The Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences has set a projection standard for
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when an image is viewed on a TV screen a dark band may appear along
the top and bottom of the screen, but with letterboxing the full movie
theater image can be seen on a home television without any appreciable
cropping of the original picture.263
Panning and scanning are techniques where the central characters in
a scene are “followed” in such a way that those characters will appear in
the middle of the screen and will not be cropped when the film is shown
on television.264 These techniques are similar to the concept of “zoom”
in film, which in the design of virtual avatars corresponds to moving the
virtual camera eye in relation to the computer graphics viewport.265
Panning is used as somewhat of a substitute for letterboxing.266 Another
technique, lexiconning alters the speed of a film, which can affect the
total running time as much as six to seven percent.267 These changes are
not very noticeable to the naked eye; but in the context of virtual reality,
adding more objects such as realistic-appearing avatars in a virtual
environment has the effect of increasing the polygon count in the scene,
and may slow down the simulation. However, unlike the five to seven
percent decrease in running time for film, increased polygon complexity
can significantly slow down the speed of the virtual environment
simulation, with noticeable lag in movements within the virtual
environment. If not monitored properly, lexiconning may extend beyond
the acceptable level and affect the overall aesthetic composition of the
film.268 Causes of action for altering the appearance of an image or scene
could potentially be under contract law or the moral rights doctrine269 as
expressed in the Copyright Act, and the Berne convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 270

feature films of 1.85:1 where the image is 1.85 times as wide as it is high. Certain films with a more
“panoramic” look may utilize aspect ratios as high as 2.35:1. In contrast, the National Television
System Committee standard is 1.33:1. McNally, supra note 233, at n. 30.
263. McNally, supra note 233, at 133.
264. Id. at 133-34.
265. The effect on the image is either a magnification or minification which could greatly
change the appearance of the virtual environment.
266. McNally, supra note 233, at 134.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 134.
269. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 106A (1990) (describing rights of certain authors to attribution and
integrity). However, see the discussion forthcoming; if virtual avatars are viewed as film, then they
will not receive protection under the Visual Rights Artists Act.
270. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Article 6bis, moral
rights, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/6bis.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
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C. Addition and Deletion of Material
Deletion of material from a film occurs under several circumstances
such as when film portions are edited or removed to allow for censorship
requirements or television commercials. For example, a film that is two
hours in length will not fit into a two hour television time slot and
provide time for commercials; thus, the film must be edited. Further, the
computer generation of images may involve the insertion of people or
objects into existing videotapes or films. This technique has been used to
add famous personalities to older films.271 In Preminger v. Columbia
Pictures Corp.,272 a New York court held that when a filmmaker grants
the television rights to his work to another party he implicitly grants the
rights to cut and edit the film.273 Director and producer Otto Preminger
complained that his film, “Anatomy of a Murder,” was to be shown on
television with several portions of the film edited out.274 The studio that
owned the copyright to the film sold the rights to Columbia Studios,
which had an agreement with its licensee television stations allowing the
stations to cut portions of the film for commercials.275 Preminger sought
an injunction to prevent this editing, but the court denied his request.276
However, the court held that should the level of cutting and editing
become so great as to become “mutilation” of the film, then Preminger
may have a proper cause of action.277 Thus, a director, without express
contract reservations, cannot prevent minor editing of a work when it is
to be shown on television.278 This finding has implications for virtual
avatars which can easily be transported into other media formats using
the internet and edited using commercially available software packages.
271. See generally Virtual Product Placement, available at http://www.ad-mktreview.com/public_html/air/ai200008.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2006); see generally Lauri
Deyhimy, Why Seeing is No Longer Believing: Misappropriation of Image and Speech, 19 Loy.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 51 (1998). In recent years television commercials for Diet Coke have digitally
inserted current celebrities into classic films pairing them with deceased actors. See Stuart Elliot,
New Spots are Set for Diet Coke, Pepsi, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at D4.
272. Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
273. Id. at 600.
274. Id. at 596.
275. Id. at 600.
276. The court held that “the right to interrupt the exhibition of a motion picture on television
for commercial announcements and to make minor deletions to accommodate time segment
requirements or to excise those portions which might be deemed, for various reasons, objectionable,
has consistently been considered a normal and essential part of the exhibition of motion pictures on
television.” Id. at 599-600.
277. Id. at 603.
278. See id. at 600. See also Gail H. Cline, On a Clear Play, You Can See Whatever:
Copyright and Trademark Issues Arising from Unauthorized Film Editing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 567 (2005).
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Would the court apply the same standard to virtual avatars, and if so,
how much “mutilation” would have to occur for an injunction to be
issued?
A more drastic example of deletion of material occurred in Gilliam
v. American Broadcasting Co.279 Gilliam involved the British comedy
group, “Monty Python,” and a U.S. broadcast of special presentations of
Python’s half-hour series “Monty Python’s Flying Circus.”280 The court
found that the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), successor to the
broadcast rights from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), had
grossly altered the program by deleting approximately 27 percent of the
material.281 The court further held that ABC had “impaired the integrity
of appellants’ work and represented to the public as the product of
appellants what was actually a mere caricature of their talents.”282
Monty Python based its cause of action on the moral rights
doctrine; however, while finding in favor of Monty Python, the court did
not adopt this approach.283 Rather, the court granted relief founded in the
economic rights of the author.284 The court premised this approach on
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.285 The Gilliam court found that since
alterations to the program represented a different product than the
original, potential Monty Python fans might be driven away.286 The
edited program represented something that was markedly different from
the original, yet ABC continued to project the work as that of Monty
Python.287 This resulted in unfair competition and economic injury, thus
allowing the application of the Lanham Act to the facts of the case.288 In
an age of digital avatars consisting of bits, movies with virtual actors,
and the commercialization of virtual reality, the potential that an image
will be pirated and altered is great. This should lead to increased

279. Gilliam v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2nd Cir. 1976).
280. Id. at 17.
281. Id. at 19.
282. Id. at 25.
283. Id.
284. “American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize strong moral rights or
provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather
than the personal, rights of authors.” Id. at 24.
285. Id. The Lanham Act provides in part: “Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services, . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
286. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
287. Id at 24.
288. Id.
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disputes and litigation with some causes of action based on the Lanham
Act.
D. Morphing of Images
Morphing is a term used in computer graphics that represents a
technique that allows one image to be gradually changed into another.289
A morphed image is generated by creating intermediate images that
represent “interpolations” between the start and end image.290 One key
question to ask, should virtual avatars gain in intelligence, is whether
they would have any legal rights, such as the right to seek an injunction
should one want to morph a particular avatar without consent (which
would be the equivalent of forced digital plastic surgery).291 In the area
of virtual pornography, an interesting set of cases with relevance to
virtual avatars has been litigated.
In 1996, Congress, in its effort to stem the flow of child
pornography, passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) of
1996.292 Section 2256(8)(A) of the CPPA covers the use of underage
“real” children.293 Section 2256(8)(C), prohibits “morphing” or the
changing of images of actual children to make them appear as though
they are engaging in acts which, in actuality, they are not.294 In Free
Speech Coalition v. Reno,295 the constitutionality of section 2256(8)(B)
of the CPPA, which prohibits any visual depiction, including any film,
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture that
“is, or appears to be” of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct
was disputed.296 The “appears to be” aspect of the statute has great
significance for the rights of virtual avatars.
The literal language of the CPPA would prevent activities that did
not involve the use of real children. One example is “virtual child

289. See About, Inc., Morphing Software and Information, available at http://graphicssoft.
about.com/od/morphing/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) (examples of software packages for morphing).
290. Generally speaking, based on how to establish the correspondence between the two
images, morphing techniques can be classified into two groups, landmark-based approaches and
image-based approaches. The first techniques require pairs of points or line segments, which are
referred to as landmarks and normally specified manually while the second techniques use features
given by the images alone, such as pixel intensities to establish the morphing.
291. See generally Barfield, supra note 34.
292. Child Pornography and Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2251-2252A, 2256 (2000).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) aff’d by Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
296. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1089.
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pornography,” in which no real child is used to create the pornography.
In contrast, morphing could involve a real child, or virtual avatar. In
Free Speech Coalition v. Reno,297 the court described that in
“morphing,” the “picture of a real person is transformed into a picture of
a child engaging in sexually explicit activity . . . Although the computergenerated image looks real, the children depicted in the image do not
actually exist;”298 the picture is therefore 100% virtual. Because the
definitions in subsections (B) and (D) of the CPPA could be applied to
situations where no actual child could be harmed by the production or
distribution of the image, the Supreme Court struck them down.299 One
aspect of this finding when considering morphing of virtual avatars, is
that they will have no right to bring an action under the CPPA because
they do represent the image of a real child. Further, since an avatar is not
a legal person at all, any pornographer would be free to morph its
image300 without violating the CPPA. The attempts by the government to
regulate pornography, brings up an interesting issue – that is, whether a
virtual avatar could be considered a person, and if so, would the avatar
be considered a legal adult? For humans, age is the criteria used to
distinguish a minor from an adult, but this criteria is not relevant for
avatars that do not age. If avatars gained personhood status, then would
their appearance be the determining characteristic as to whether they
were considered to be a minor? Such a criteria, would seem unworkable
as age is sometimes difficult to judge. Therefore, some other criteria,
such as the complexity of the algorithms that enable the avatar to solve
problems and make decisions, may be considered.
Another case with relevance for virtual avatars and morphing is
Greenberg v. National Geographic Society.301 This case involved a
freelance photographer who brought a copyright infringement suit
against National Geographic, which published a searchable electronic
collection of its prior issues, including those in which the photographer’s
copyrighted pictures had appeared.302 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the use of a copyrighted cover photograph to create a
morphing video montage infringed the photographer’s exclusive rights
to prepare derivative works.303 Further, a magazine publisher’s use in

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See generally id.
Id. at 1098 n.1 (Ferguson J., dissenting).
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002).
Assuming no objection from a third party owner of the graphical image.
Greenberg v. National Geographic Soc., 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1275.
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this instance was not fair use. The photographs were transformed, and
thus became part of larger, new collective work.304 Note that in order to
qualify as a derivative work, the resulting work (including “revisions”)
after transformation must qualify as an “original work of authorship.”305
The court found that, with respect to the montage and its
unauthorized use of Greenberg’s copyrightable photograph, “the Society
had infringed upon the photographer’s exclusive right under § 106(2) to
prepare derivative works based upon his copyrighted photograph.”306
The Society selected ten preexisting works, photographs included in
covers of ten issues of the Magazine, including Greenberg’s, and
transformed them into a moving visual sequence that morphed one into
the other.307 The court stated: “This sequence, an animated, transforming
selection and arrangement of preexisting copyrighted photographs
constitutes at once a compilation, collective work, and, with reference to
the Greenberg photograph, was a derivative work.”308 Given the nature
of avatars, existing as bits and normally accessible on the Internet, such
transformative uses may also apply to avatars. This could bring up a
host of issues concerning the protection of avatars. However, based on
case law to date, the decision in Greenberg provides support that the
morphing of avatars, while not actionable under the CPPA, given the
Ashcroft decision, may be actionable under copyright law – especially if
the court views the morphed image as a violation of the owner’s
derivative rights.
Cases dealing with patent law may also have relevance for the
protection of virtual avatars. Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
involved issues of claim construction in the area of matching the lip
movements of actors to a dubbed language added to a film.309 Plaintiff
Bloomstein filed suit alleging that techniques Paramount and Lucas used
to digitally alter facial features in the movie Forrest Gump infringed
Bloomstein’s patents.310 Bloomstein’s two patents essentially described

304. Id. at 1274; See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
305. Id. at 1270 n.3.
306. Id. at 1274.
307. Id. at 1269.
308. Id. at 1274; see generally Warren Publishing Company, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 522
U.S. 963 (1997).
309. Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20839 (N.D. Cal. March 10, 1998). Plaintiff Bloomstein filed action against defendants Paramount
Pictures Corporation (“Paramount”) and Lucas Digital Ltd. (“Lucas”), alleging that special effects
“morphing” techniques used in the movie “Forrest Gump” infringed United States Patent Nos.
4,600,281 (“the ‘281 patent”) and 4,827,532 (“the ‘532 patent”), issued to Bloomstein. Id. at 3.
310. Id.
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the same invention.311 The court reasoned,“When one wishes to dub a
new soundtrack containing a new language over the original soundtrack
of a motion picture, the differences in the languages may be significant
enough to make the lip movements of the faces in the unaltered film fail
to conform to the new, dubbed language.”312 Bloomstein invented a
process by which the lip movements of a face in the unaltered film could
by digitized and altered to conform to the new language.313 While this
case was litigated mainly on the issue of patent infringement, and
focused on claim construction, some insights can be made regarding
virtual avatars in general. Much of the technology that an avatar may use
to express itself, such as techniques to morph, or digitized speech, are
under patent protection. As the Bloomstein case highlights, holders of
patents are inclined to protect their rights. Therefore, it should be
interesting to see if, in the future, a patent infringement action may be
brought based on an avatar’s conduct, and whether the avatar, or avatar’s
owner, would respond seeking a declaratory judgment.
VIII. MORAL RIGHTS FOR VIRTUAL AVATARS
The doctrine of moral rights refers to rights regarding the
personality of the artist and to the preservation of the integrity of his
intellectual creations.314 The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA)315 provides moral rights protection for artists and protects the
personal interests in their work, even after the copyright is transferred to
a third-party purchaser.316 VARA was the result of efforts of moral
rights advocates to overcome Congress’ failure to adopt the moral rights
provision of the Berne Convention.317 The legislation protects works of
visual art318 and gives the artist two kinds of moral rights—the right of
311. Id.
312. Id. at 5.
313. Id. at 3.
314. See Ronald B. Standler, Moral Rights of Authors in the USA (1988), available at
http://www.rbs2.com/moral.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
315. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113, 301, 501(a) (1990).
316. William A. Tanenbaum & Jeffrey M. Butler, The Impact of the Visual Artists Rights Act, 9
N.Y. L.J., 1 (1993) (the moral rights provided in VARA are independent of the usual copyright and
are retained by the artist, even if the economic copyrights are sold or assigned).
317. Since Congress felt that U.S. law already provided such protection in the form of unfair
competition, privacy, defamation and misrepresentation causes of action and in certain provisions of
the Copyright Act, it chose not to include the moral rights section of Berne in the ratification
legislation. Id.
318. “A work of visual art is - (1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single
copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer . . . (2) a still photographic image produced for
exhibition purposes only. . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1990).
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attribution and the right of integrity.319 The right of attribution allows the
artist to claim authorship of a work and prevent the use of her name as
the author of any work which she did not create.320 Presently, no
intelligent avatar is awarded attribution rights for its output, but in the
future this might be a necessary outcome given the avatar’s ability to
create unique and creative works beyond the original programming. The
right of attribution allows the artist the right to prevent the use of her
name in connection with a mutilated, distorted or otherwise modified
work, if that alteration would be “prejudicial to . . .her honor or
reputation.”321 Likewise, the right of integrity gives an artist the right to
prevent intentional mutilations, distortions and other modifications of a
work, which would be prejudicial to her honor or reputation.322 The
rights granted under VARA may not be transferred, but may be waived
by the artist.323
VARA’s passage was a big step toward recognizing moral rights in
the United States. However, the enacted version does not protect motion
pictures, even though the original version did provide such protection.324
Without the protection that VARA provides other artists, film directors
can have altered works attributed to them.325 One difference, however,
between works protected by VARA and motion pictures is that when
films are colorized or otherwise altered, the original generally still
exists.326 When a “painting or sculpture is altered, the original work is
changed forever.”327 Virtual avatars seem to fit better into the film
category, since the concept of an “original” is difficult to apply to virtual
avatars given that they exist as bits. If courts follow this reasoning, a
virtual avatar would not be protected under VARA.
319. “The right of attribution [is] known as the right of paternity in European practice.”
Tanenbaum & Butler, supra note 316, at 11, col. 1.
320. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1) (1990).
321. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (1990).
322. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (1990).
323. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (1990).
324. Timothy M. Casey, The Visual Artists Rights Act, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 85, 98
(1991).
325. Id.
326. 17 U.S.C. §101 fully defines “work of visual art” as “(1) a painting, drawing, print, or
sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or
fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the
signature or other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a still photographic image produced for
exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.” 17 U.S.C.
§101 (1990).
327. Casey, supra note 324, at 99.
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The moral rights doctrine is included in the copyright laws of many
European countries, as well as the laws of countries subscribing to the
Berne Convention.328 Given that virtual avatars reside in a virtual
environment which is most likely accessible on the internet, the moral
rights doctrine as applied in Europe could be relevant for the protection
of avatars created in the United States. Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention requires that countries that are members recognize,
independently of the author’s economic rights, that “the author shall
have the right to claim authorship of the work” – the right of paternity –
and “to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation” – the right of integrity.329 The
scope of moral rights protection varies among countries that recognize
these rights.330 However, the doctrine encompasses three major
elements: (1) the right of disclosure; (2) the right of paternity; and (3)
the right of integrity.331 Under the right of disclosure, the creator has the
privilege of determining when to release his work.332 The basis of this
right is the theory that the creator is the sole judge of when a work is
first ready for public dissemination.333
The second element of the doctrine of moral rights under the Berne
Convention, is the right of paternity which entitles the author to have his
name and authorship recognized.334 This right allows the creator to
present himself to the public as the creator of a work.335 Furthermore, the
right of paternity permits the author to require others to acknowledge his
authorship.336 Additionally, this right enables the author to prevent
others from attributing works to him which he did not originate.337 The
third element, the right of integrity, is the right most pertinent to virtual
avatars. The right of integrity enables the creator to prevent any
328. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
329. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, ar 6bis (Sept 9, 1886;
revised July 24 1974 and amended 1979; entered into force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989 (Sen. Treaty
Doc. 99-127)) U.S.T. Lexis 160 or 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715.
330. Kohs, supra note 238, at 11-15.
331. Id. at 11-12.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 12.
334. Moral Rights, available at http://art.ntu.ac.uk/liveart/issues/Chapter7.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2005).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Rights: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors
and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 561-62 (1940).
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distortion of or modification to his work if the alteration would
constitute a misrepresentation of his artistic expression.338 This right,
like the other moral rights, is held by the creator and is independent of
any economic rights that he may or may not have in the work.339
The United States enacted the Berne Convention Act in 1988.340
However, the implementing legislation indicated that the law in the
United States as it existed on the date of enactment satisfied the United
States’ obligations under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention and that
no further rights were to be recognized for that purpose.341 Thus, the
Implementation Act did not change the pre-Berne Convention
precedents or balance of rights between authors and proprietors.342 As
section 3(b) of the Berne Convention Implementation Act stated, no
change in American law regarding the right of paternity or the right of
integrity occurred as the result of the implementation of this new
legislation.343 Accordingly, the legal theories previously used to protect
an author’s moral rights, based upon provisions of the Lanham Act and
common law principles, remain the law in the United States.
Another legal theory used by the courts to protect the integrity of a
work prior to the United States’ ratification of the Berne Convention is
embodied in the law of defamation. An action for defamation protects an
individual from harm to his reputation or his standing in the
community.344 Given the ability of virtual avatars to take on the look of
another person, this tort may still serve people who have been harmed by
a “look-alike” avatar, especially if it portrays them in a false light. In
Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., a publisher revised an edition of a
well-known attorney’s law book.345 By including the author’s name on
338. Kohs, supra note 238, at 12.
339. Id. at 12.
340. Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 328.
341. Id. (amending title 17 of the United States Code to make the changes in the United States
copyright law that are necessary for the United States to adhere to the Berne Convention. Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988).
342. See id.
343. Section 3(b) of the Act states:
Certain Rights Not Affected.—The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of
the United States thereto, and satisfaction of United States obligations thereunder, do not
expand or reduce any right of an author of a work, whether claimed under Federal, State,
or the common law: (1) to claim authorship of the work; or (2) to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the work, that would prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.
Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 328.
344. See Furine Blaise, Game Over: Issues Arising When Copyrighted Work is Licensed to
Video Game Manufacturers, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 517 (2005).
345. Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 168 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1960).
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the title page, the revision implicitly misrepresented that the author
himself, rather than the publisher, had written the revision, which
contained many errors.346 Because publishing in the name of a wellknown author of a literary work tended to injure his position in the legal
community, the court held that the plaintiff had a cause of action against
the publisher based upon defamation.347 Similarly, in Ben-Oliel v. Press
Publishing Co., the Court of Appeals of New York held that attribution
of an inaccurate newspaper article on the social customs of Palestine and
Mosaic symbolism to a well-known authority, which she did not write,
constituted libel.348 As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, as well as the law of defamation, are used to
preserve the integrity of an author’s work. Both theories may aid a party
who alleges that they have been harmed by an avatar. Could such
theories also be used by intelligent virtual avatars to protect the integrity
of their image and output?
IX. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS PERSONHOOD
There are three notable trends in virtual avatars: (1) they are getting
smarter, (2) their physical appearance is becoming more photorealistic
and human-like, and (3) their behavior is becoming more sophisticated.
In regards to the three points above, imagine one day that a virtual avatar
claims that it is a person,349 and that it is therefore entitled to certain
constitutional rights. Should the law grant constitutional rights to
intelligent avatars that have intellectual capabilities like those of
humans? The answer may turn out to vary with the nature of the
constitutional right and our understanding of the underlying justification
for the right.350 For example, Samuelson, Miller, and other legal scholars
have noted that a rationale for copyright is to provide an incentive for
authors to create copyrightable works.351 As they argue, since “software
and machines” currently need no such incentive to create works, there
346. Id. at 644.
347. Id. at 645-46.
348. Ben-Oliel v. Press Publ’g Co., 167 N.E. 432 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1929); see also Am. Law
Book Co. v. Chamberlayne, 165 F. 313 (2nd Cir. 1908) (acknowledging possibility of recovering
damages for libel resulting from publication of mutilated or altered form of author’s work).
349. Hans Moravec, MIND CHILDREN: THE FUTURE OF ROBOT AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 5968 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988) (estimating that it would take roughly ten trillion calculations per
second to equal the speed of the human brain and that computers will reach this speed around 2020).
350. See generally Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Encrypted Self: Fleshing Out the Rights of
Electronic Personalities, in FUTURE CODES: ESSAYS IN ADVANCED COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW 117-36 (Curtis E. A. Karnow ed., Artech House Publisher 1997).
351. Samuelson, supra note 70; Miller, supra note 106.
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can be no copyright awarded to such entities. The lack of incentive
shown by a virtual avatar when producing an output under the direction
of a human could conceivably be overcome when avatars evolve that
self-program and pursue objectives of their own. The economic
justification for producing an output when a human author is involved,
may also provide an incentive for virtual avatars. An intelligent avatar
that evolved to the point where it claimed to be conscious and deserving
of legal rights, may need to purchase computing resources and memory,
or even the assistance of humans for the performance of tasks. In
addition, other incentives to motivate virtual avatars to produce outputs
useful to society may become clear as virtual avatars evolve and interact
with humans and other avatars.
Imagine, also that an intelligent avatar claims that it cannot be
owned and has been forced into involuntary servitude. A lawyer takes its
case, and files a civil rights action on its behalf, against its owner. How
should the legal system deal with such a claim? Would the intelligent
avatar have standing to pursue such an action?352 And with regard to
intellectual property rights, what if an intelligent avatar creates a work
completely independent from a human’s input that meets the
requirements for copyright? Would the court then award the avatar a
copyright for the work? The current answer is surely no, but why not?
The work could clearly pass the copyright hurdles of an original work
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.353 The argument of antagonists
of awarding a copyright to an artificial entity comes down to a
requirement that a human being be the author of a copyrightable work.
For this reason, the issue of personhood for non-human entities becomes
an important topic when discussing legal rights for intelligent avatars.
Before exploring the issue of personhood for artificially intelligent
entities in greater detail, it should be noted that granting legal
recognition to non-human entities may not pose an insurmountable
problem doctrinally. It is already done for corporations.354 In terms of
policy considerations, Samuelson has previously argued that the
ownership allocation between humans and software should not only
make sense, but reflect the realities of the world.355 Those realities, in

352. See generally TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983); Christopher D. Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CALIF. L. REV. 450,
458ff (1972); See generally Joseph Mendelson III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of
Standing Under The Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795 (1997).
353. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
354. See Santa Clara Cty. V. S. Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
355. Samuelson, supra note 70, at 1192.
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regard to intelligent systems, have changed dramatically since
antagonists argued against the idea of copyright protection for artificially
intelligent entities in the 80’s and early 90’s.356 Given the advances in
autonomous machines, smart computer vision systems, and selfprogramming neural nets, Samuelson’s past statement is even more
relevant for these times than when it was first made.357
Karnow introduced the term “electronic person,” or “epers,” when
discussing the issue of legal rights for “agents” or “avatars” existing
within cyberspace. 358 Taking a liberal view on legal rights for software
agents, Karnow argued that epers should be allowed to own physical
property, maintain bank accounts, enter into contracts, and be recognized
as authors of expression, subject to constitutional protection.359 Solum360
and Karnow361 have also previously addressed the issue of personhood
for artificially intelligent entities. According to Solum, “the question
whether an entity should be considered a legal person is reducible to
other questions about whether or not the entity can and should be made
the subject of a set of legal rights and duties.”362 For example, “the
particular bundle of rights and duties that accompanies legal personhood
varies with the nature of the entity.”363 In this context, both corporations
and natural persons are considered legal persons, but they have different
sets of legal rights and duties.364
Intuitively, when one uses the term “person” she means to refer to a
human being as opposed to a virtual avatar controlled by software.365
However, based on legal principles, the definition of a person is not as
straight-forward as one might expect. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
person as “[a]n entity (such as a corporation) that is recognized by law
as having the rights and duties of a human being.”366 Furthermore, an
356. See Samuelson, supra note 70; Miller, supra note 106.
357. One could argue that an intelligent avatar and the programmer could share rights to any
intellectual property created by the avatar, since the programmer wrote the initial software to create
the avatar. However, if the avatar where to become truly autonomous and create works independent
from the initial programming, would granting the programmer rights to the avatar’s property then be
similar to the idea of granting property rights to one’s parents once the child reached adulthood?
358. Karnow, supra note 350, at 128.
359. Id. at 128.
360. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1231 (1992).
361. Karnow, supra note 350, at 129-31.
362. Solum, supra note 360, at 1239.
363. Id.
364. Id. See generally Jonathan Chaplin, Political Perspective: Toward A Social Pluralist
Theory of Institutional Rights, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 147 (2005).
365. See generally Barfield, supra note 34.
366. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (7th Ed. 1999).
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artificial person is defined as “[a]n entity, such as a corporation, created
by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human being; real or
imaginary, who for purposes of legal reasoning is treated more or less as
a human being (also termed a legal person).”367 Based on the latter
definition, an intelligent avatar could be regarded as an artificial person
and awarded some legal rights. While all human beings, regardless of
intellectual capabilities (e.g., those severely retarded) are considered to
be a “legal person,” not all persons are considered human beings.368
Indeed, under common law, corporations are regarded as “persons” with
full rights to sue, be sued, hold property, and so on. However, as noted
by Solum,369 corporations have [human] boards of directors which exert
control over the corporation; in contrast, avatars in some domains
already perform complex tasks without the supervision of a human.
Since corporations have the status of a person for some legal
purposes, we can ask whether this legal principle should be considered
as precedent for the issue of legal personhood for avatars. There are
several reasons why legal personhood is denied to current
implementations of avatars. One is the lack of a full repertoire of
intellectual abilities similar to those of humans; to be granted legal
personhood, it will not be enough for avatars to be an idiot savant, an
expert in a narrow field of knowledge or conduct (such as making
theatre reservations or playing chess). Instead, avatars will have to
exhibit a broad range of intellectual abilities before they begin to
approach human-like cognitive and perceptual capabilities, and thus
warrant consideration of their status vis-à-vis legal personhood.370
Another reason why legal personhood is denied to current versions of
avatars is the lack of self-awareness in such systems. Without selfawareness, not only is an avatar denied legal personhood, but also
denied the characteristic of being alive. In fact, when the crucial aspects
of personhood are irretrievably lost, it is generally assumed that an
individual has died, i.e., is no longer a person.371 Finally, another reason
why avatars are denied legal personhood is based on legal precedent; no
such entity has ever approached human levels of intelligence or selfawareness. Thus, the issue of legal personhood for such systems has not

367. Id. at 1162.
368. Barfield, supra note 34.
369. Solum, supra note 360, at 1239.
370. Barfield, supra note 34. However, note that corporations normally fulfill a need within a
defined area, that is, they do not show a wide range of behavior characteristic of a human being.
371. Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness and Nancy
Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. REV. 659 (1991).
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been considered.372
The debate on legal personhood for virtual avatars can benefit by a
consideration of the legal status of humans and great apes, two species
which clearly differ in levels of intelligence; although great apes are
certainly intelligent creatures and have complex social structures.373 We
deny legal personhood to great apes not only because they are not human
beings, but also because they have a significantly lower level of
intelligence than the “normal” human and it is unclear as to whether they
exhibit self-awareness.374 Although some apes may have the capability
to learn language as evidenced through signing at the level of a 3-4 year
old child, they are not provided legal personhood.375 In contrast, people
with severe cognitive defects are provided the legal protection of
personhood, regardless of their intellectual capabilities; although the
state may assume some responsibility toward their upkeep. So, if
humans with cognitive defects and those severely retarded are awarded
the status of a legal person, why then not consider such rights
appropriate for intelligent avatars that may at the least be equally smart?
We can also consider the legal status of children in current society
as legal precedent for the treatment of intelligent avatars.376 Under the
law, children share several attributes of personhood with adults, but their
immaturity disables them from receiving all the legal rights of an
adult.377 Until fully possessed of mature reason and adult perspective,
the law does not allow children to assume either the prerogatives or
burdens of full legal personhood. However, upon the age of majority, the
law fully invests its citizens of constitutional rights, giving them both
legal prerogatives and burdens.378 Before the age of majority, the law
372. See generally Barfield, supra note 34; see generally Martine Rothblatt, Bioethics: Should
We Stop a Company From Unplugging an Intelligent Machine?, available at http://www.Kurzweil
ai.net/meme/frame.html?m=4 (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
373. See The Great Ape Legal Project, available at http://www.aldf.org/article.asp?cid=20 (last
visited Oct. 30, 2005); See Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human
Rights? 105 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2005).
374. See Adam J. Kolber, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and
Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163 (2001).
375. See Elizabeth L. Decoux, In the Valley of the Dry Bones: Reuniting the Word “Standing”
with its Meaning in Animal Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTL., L & POL’Y REV. 681, 755 (2005).
376. See generally Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family,
93 UTAH L. REV. 983 (1996); Children’s Rights an Overview, available at http://www.law.cornell.
edu/topics/childrens_rights.htlml (last visited Nov. 5, 2005); Children’s Rights, available at
http://hrworg/children/child-legal.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
377. Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children’s Perspectives and
the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11 (1994).
378. See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body is it Anyway? An Updated Model of
Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLICY 251 (2005).
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seems to manifest a gradual investment in children of legal personhood,
roughly corresponding to their gradual attainment of adulthood.379 Until
the age of majority, however, the law views children as lacking in at
least some essential attributes of adulthood necessary to their exercise of
legal rights and assumption of legal burdens. Arguably, we exclude
children from legal standing and personhood for their own protection,
providing other remedies for their claims. Indeed, the law assigns
children’s claims to parents and the state, assuming one or the other
party will best represent children’s interests. Children cannot, the
reasoning follows, know or do what is best for them. In the context of
intelligent avatars, would it be prudent to treat such entities from a
similar legal perspective as minors, affording them some legal rights, but
not those of a mature adult? What the above examples seem to suggest is
that granting significant rights to virtual avatars based solely on
intellectual capability, is ripe with contradictions.380 With the exception
of corporations, the essential aspect of an entity that seems to lead to
legal rights is self-awareness and human-like intelligence.381
For the time being, virtual avatars will be regarded as computer
programs consisting of datasets and algorithms, along with a visual
representation. As such, they may receive the legal protection that is
awarded software, and the protection awarded images from copyright
and trademark law.382 However, unlike standard software programs,
intelligent avatars may deviate from their original programming until
they are no longer recognizable to the original programmer(s).
Avatars may run on a single computer or local cluster, or in a
distributed fashion across a public network. They may be designed using
“classical,” or deterministic, programming algorithms, in which case
they should be able to summarize or “explain” their thought process,
which could then be evaluated using step by step logic. More likely,
however, intelligent avatars will have a substantial “neural network”
component so their internal state may consist of a large number of
unlabeled weight values. In this case, they may output an answer without
being able to “explain” it. Intelligent avatars may have a reflective
379. See id.
380. Barfield, supra note 34.
381. Such self-awareness, according to Kurzweil, a leading futurist, may occur in this century.
See generally, RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY
(Viking Press 2005).
382. See Data Cash Sys. Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc. 480 F.Supp. 1063 (N.D.Ill. 1979) (dealing
with the copyrightability of computer programs); see generally Pamela Samuelson, CONTU
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine Readable
Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984).
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capability that can at least partly describe and summarize the weights
used to reach a given conclusion. According to one commentator, one
might expect avatars to become strong believers in intellectual property
law (copyrights, patents, trade secrets, etc.), to prevent their code and
data from being stolen and copied, thus dramatically lowering their
potential wages due to competition with clones of themselves.383
Since all machines have owners who pay their rent, power, and
network connection charges, under the current law we can always look
to the owner, whether a human or a corporation, and hold them
responsible for the acts of the avatar, while assuming that the avatar
merely acts as their agent.384 Under this view, the avatars, no matter how
smart or decentralized, is just an item of personal property. If the avatar
enters into a contract, that agreement binds the owner (subject to the
usual rules of contract formation) and not the avatar, and if the avatar
commits a tort, its owner is liable to pay compensation for any
damages.385
In conclusion, a major event in U.S. corporate law was the
landmark Supreme Court decision to treat corporations as “persons”
entitled to the equal protection of the laws under the 14th
Amendment.386 Will there also be a similar landmark case for virtual
avatars, or, as necessity dictates, will rights for avatars appear slowly
without any particular landmark decision paving the way for their
emancipation.387 Many questions remain unanswered, as there is literally
no case law on the rights of artificially intelligent entities in general, and
intelligent avatars specifically. However, given the increasing
intelligence of avatars, significant legal disputes involving their actions
very likely will arise in the future. This article provided a framework in
which to consider how future litigation may develop, and potential
causes of action which may be raised.

383. See Karnow, supra note 350 at 128 (including a discussion of the rights of electronic
persons or “epers”).
384. See generally Solum, supra note 360.
385. See generally Karnow, supra note 39 (discussing the difficulty of finding a responsible
party given a distributed computing system).
386. Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
387. Barfield, supra note 34.
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